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Letter dated 23 July 2018 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2399 (2018) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2399 (2018) have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 32 (c) of resolution 2399 (2018), the midterm report on their work.

The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic on 9 July 2018 and was considered by the Committee on 20 July 2018.

The Panel of Experts would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Coordinator

Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic
extended pursuant to resolution 2399 (2018)

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Midterm report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2399 (2018)

Summary

Confirming the difficulties experienced by the Government in making progress towards peace, the reporting period was marked by serious outbreaks of violence, including in areas where the situation had previously improved, such as Bangui and Bambari. "Operation Sukula", jointly conducted on 7 and 8 April 2018 by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), internal security forces and the Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) in the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui, triggered an increase in intercommunal tensions, with cases of incitement to discrimination and violence and a series of violent clashes from early April to early May, resulting in the highest number of casualties in the capital during a 30-day period since 2014, with at least 70 people killed and 330 injured, most of them civilians. MINUSCA and national security forces failed to dismantle the bases of the PK5 self-defence groups and install internal security forces in the area; instead, the operation led to a strengthening of the grip of the self-defence groups on the neighbourhood.

Following relevant exemptions and notifications to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, the country's security and armed forces received training and military equipment from the Russian Federation. Coupled with the support of other partners such as the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic, those efforts are facilitating the reoperationalization of FACA.

The ongoing redeployment of FACA and "Operation Sukula", deemed by ex-Séléka factions to be actions hostile to the Muslim community, have contributed to the hardening of the positions of these groups, in particular the Front Populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC). As a result, the FPRC leaders and sanctioned individuals Abdoulaye Hissène and Noureddine Adam continued their attempts to reunify the Séléka, strengthened their efforts to acquire weaponry, especially from the territory of the Sudan, and consolidated parallel administration in areas under their control as a key funding strategy.

Ex-Séléka factions, like other armed groups, have, however, maintained their engagement in the African Union Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, under which consultations began in November 2017 and the conclusion of an agreement between the Government and the 14 recognized armed groups is planned in the coming months.

Ongoing fighting resulted in violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, involving both anti-balaka and ex-Séléka fighters. This included widespread rapes and sexual assaults (in the Bossangoa area) and indiscriminate killing of civilians and targeted attacks against humanitarian personnel and humanitarian bases (around Markoundia, Bambari and Bangassou). The lack of respect shown by armed elements for medical facilities resulted in the reduction of access to health care for the civilian population in Bangui and in Bambari. Five peacekeepers have also been killed since early 2018 as a result of targeted attacks.

While hunting ammunition continues to be used by anti-balaka fighters, the engagement of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic with the Congo resulted in the announcement of measures by the Congolese authorities to better regulate the sale of ammunition from the Manufacture d'armes et de cartouches du Congo.

The present report also describes a disruption in the positive dynamics that had been created by the lifting of the suspension of diamond exports under the Kimberley Process. Since late 2017, a serious decrease in the legal trade has been noted as well as a related surge in trafficking in rough diamonds, owing to the closing of the offices of most buying houses in the provinces. The report also underlines the impact of the shortcomings in the State's control over airports with respect to trafficking in natural resources.

Finally, the report addresses new cases of sanctions violations, in particular travel ban violations by former President François Bozizé, whom the Panel found to have been using a South Sudanese diplomatic passport bearing the name Samuel Peter Mudde.

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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Background

1. On 30 January 2018, the Security Council adopted its resolution 2399 (2018), by which the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic was mandated to, *inter alia*, provide to the Council, after discussion with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, a midterm report no later than 30 July 2018.

2. In accordance with resolution 2399 (2018), the present report, *inter alia*, assesses the implementation of sanctions imposed by the Security Council (an arms embargo, a travel ban and an asset freeze) and addresses a number of issues with the aim of identifying individuals and entities involved in sanctionable activities, as defined in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the resolution.

Cooperation

3. Since the issuance of its 2017 final report (S/2017/1023) in December 2017, the Panel has travelled to 14 of the 16 prefectures of the Central African Republic (see map in annex 1.1).

4. In addition to undertaking missions within the Central African Republic, the Panel carried out official visits to the Congo, France and Italy. The Democratic Republic of the Congo did not accommodate the visit proposed by the Panel. The Panel regrets that on 22 April 2018, two of its members were expelled from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo after initially having been allowed into the country. The two experts had in their possession all the required documentation, including an official invitation letter from the Ministry of Defence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

5. The Panel notes with appreciation the support and collaboration of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

Methodology

6. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of 22 December 2006 (see S/2006/997, annex). While it intends to be as transparent as possible, in situations in which the identification of sources would expose them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel intends to withhold identifying information.

7. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and endeavours to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any information in the report for which those parties may be cited, for their review, comment and response, within a specified deadline.

8. The Panel safeguards the independence of its work against any effort to undermine its impartiality or create a perception of bias. The Panel approved the text, conclusions and recommendations in the present report on the basis of consensus prior to its transmission by the Panel's Coordinator to the President of the Security Council.

II. Sanctions implementation: arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban

9. Pursuant to resolution 2399 (2018), the Panel has been mandated to collect, examine and analyse information on the implementation of sanctions measures: an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban.

A. Arms embargo and national security and defence forces

10. The present section includes descriptions of developments related to the implementation of the arms embargo by the national authorities and their international partners, and of related decisions of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013), such as exemptions to the arms embargo, as well as related developments concerning security sector reform. Information on arms trafficking by armed groups is included in paragraphs 69, 81, 106 and 107 below.

National security and defence forces: training, equipment and deployment

Training

11. The European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic is currently finalizing the training of a third battalion of the Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) in Bangui. All trained battalions are gradually being redeployed in Bangui and beyond (see para. 18 below). The Training Mission also supported the training of 232 demobilized members of armed groups integrated into the national army, which was completed on 11 May as part of the pilot project for disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (see S/2017/639, para. 26, and S/2017/1023, para. 18).¹

12. On 26 December 2017, the Committee received a notification from the Russian Federation regarding the training of Central African defence and security forces, involving 5 military and 170 civilian Russian instructors for a period of one year. The first and second training sessions for FACA and the Presidential Guard in the Sudan and Berengo (Lobaye Prefecture) conducted by Russian instructors were concluded on 31 March and 30 May 2018, respectively. The third training session commenced on 30 May in Berengo. The presence of instructors from the Russian Federation among the Presidential Guard, as observed by the Panel in Berengo on 31 March, was reported to be part of the training exercise.²

13. Russian instructors are currently deployed in Sibut and Bangassou in support of recent FACA deployments.³ They were also involved in escorting a convoy transporting materials for the construction of hospitals, which travelled from Am Dafok and through the towns of Birao, Ndélé, Kaga Bandoro, Bria and Bangui between 7 and 26 May 2018.⁴ Twenty-four instructors are currently ensuring the security of hospitals donated by the Russian Federation in Bria, and 20 are doing so in Ouadda (Haute-Kotto Prefecture).⁵

14. In Bangui on 12 March 2018, national authorities, with the support of MINUSCA, started the training of the 500 candidates for the police and gendarmerie

¹ Meeting with European Union Military Training Mission, Bangui, 12 June 2018.

² Meeting with presidential security adviser, Bangui, 6 April 2018.

³ Panel's mission to Sibut, 25 May 2018. Confidential document, 25 June 2018.

⁴ Communications with confidential sources, 9 and 28 May 2018.

⁵ Meeting with presidential security adviser, Bangui, 19 June 2018. Panel's mission to Bria, 8–11 June 2018.

recruited throughout the country (see S/2017/1023, paras. 14–16).⁶ Since April 2018, Russian instructors have also started the training of 160 policemen and 50 gendarmes in Berengo as a precondition for assigning them weapons in view of their deployment.⁷

15. Further information on training by all international partners is included in annex 2.1.

Deployment and equipment

16. Deployed police and gendarmes face heightened security challenges, which prevent them from fulfilling their core law enforcement tasks. On 30 May 2018 in Bambari, armed elements of the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) attacked the local gendarmerie and police premises, which left one gendarme killed and several wounded.⁸ The gendarmes, armed with 27 AK-type assault rifles but rapidly running short of ammunition, fled to the area under the control of anti-balaka elements who took six of the gendarmes' weapons.⁹

17. In addition, the Director General of the Gendarmerie told the Panel that gendarmes, now equipped mainly with lethal equipment, were not currently in a position to undertake law enforcement activities, owing to a lack of adequate training and materiel, including crowd control equipment. The Panel underlines that deliveries of military equipment have so far been focused almost exclusively on FACA, rather than on internal security forces.

18. With the support of MINUSCA and sometimes accompanied by Russian instructors, trained FACA personnel have gradually been redeployed in Obo, Paoua, Sibut and Bangassou. While feedback from international partners on the performance of FACA in those locations is quite positive,¹⁰ it must be stressed that FACA currently has insufficient capacity or lacks logistical support for conducting operations without the substantive and constant support of MINUSCA and/or the Russian instructors.¹¹

19. On 10 June 2018, FACA elements, accompanied by Russian instructors passing through Bambari on their way to Bangassou, were attacked by UPC fighters, which resulted in the wounding of two FACA soldiers and a Russian instructor.¹² MINUSCA had to facilitate a meeting between the Russian delegation and the UPC leader Ali Darassa, in Bokolbo on 17 June, to obtain guarantees for the safe passage of the FACA convoy.¹³ On 22 June, the FACA convoy reached Bangassou. The incident highlights the capacity of some armed groups to disrupt the deployment of FACA and the extension of State authority.

Delivery, inspection and use of exempted weapons and ammunition

20. Between 26 January and 7 February 2018, nine aircraft arrived at M'Poko International Airport in Bangui to deliver weapons and ammunition as part of the military cooperation between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Central African Republic, and as allowed under an exemption by the Committee on 15 December 2017. All parties concerned repeatedly committed to

⁶ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 28 May 2018.

⁷ Meeting with presidential security adviser, Bangui, 19 June 2018.

⁸ Meeting with the Director General of the Gendarmerie, 23 and 24 May 2018.

⁹ Ibid., Confidential document received by the Panel on 29 June 2018.

¹⁰ Meeting with European Union Military Training Mission, 12 June 2018. Confidential meetings, 23 May 2018. Panel's mission to Sibut, 25 May 2018.

¹¹ Letter dated 15 May 2018 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council.

¹² Confidential report, 11 June 2018. Meeting with Russian security advisers, Bangui, 14 June 2018.

¹³ Meeting with UPC leader, Bangui, 16 June 2018. Confidential document, 17 June 2018.

facilitating a detailed inspection of the stockpile stored at Camp de Roux in Bangui,¹⁴ but that has not yet taken place. The few boxes of ammunition and weapons viewed by the Panel and the United Nations Mine Action Service at Camp de Roux and Sibut correspond to the original list submitted to the Committee.¹⁵ On 18 June 2018, the Minister of Defence sent a letter to MINUSCA requesting its assistance in expeditiously organizing an inspection to speed up the detailed verification process (see annex 2.2 and recommendation in para. 119 (a) below).

21. The Russian weapons and ammunition are being gradually distributed to the trained national defence and security forces deployed in Bangui and beyond. Weapons and ammunition have been assigned to elements from the Presidential Guard, FACA, the police, the gendarmerie and the Ministry of Justice. Representatives of the Russian Federation in Bangui gave the Panel a detailed account of the distribution and indicated the precise number of firearms training sessions conducted.¹⁶

22. A portion of the military equipment repatriated from Cameroon (see S/2017/1023, para. 25 and annex 2.4), as approved by the Committee on 4 May 2017, was transported to Paoua with a view to being used during "Operation Mbaranga" (see para. 97 below).¹⁷

23. Annex 2.2 provides additional information on the delivery and use of the exempted weapons and ammunition mentioned above.

B. Implementation of targeted sanctions (travel ban and asset freeze)

24. The sanctions list of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013), which identifies individuals and entities subject to the travel ban and the asset freeze, is available on the website of the Committee.¹⁸ It currently includes 11 individuals and two entities.

Use of a South Sudanese diplomatic passport by François Bozizé

25. In its 2017 final report, the Panel indicated that sanctioned individual François Bozizé was most likely travelling with counterfeit documents (see S/2017/1023, paras. 32–33). The Panel suspected that Mr. Bozizé had been travelling with a South Sudanese diplomatic passport bearing the name Samuel Peter Mudde. Following several request for information, made to countries where the former President had travelled, on 2 February 2018 Kenya shared a copy of the above-mentioned passport, enabling the Panel to confirm by facial recognition that the passport was indeed being used by Mr. Bozizé (see annex 2.3).

26. As a result, on 16 February 2018 the Committee amended the information on Mr. Bozizé included in the sanctions list and issued a press release on the matter.¹⁹

27. On 8 February 2018, the Panel sent a letter to the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations requesting information regarding the passport used by Mr. Bozizé. The South Sudanese authorities have yet to provide a response (see recommendation in para. 119 (b) below).

¹⁴ Meetings with presidential security adviser, Bangui, 6 April, 24 May and 4 June 2018. Meeting with the Minister of Defence, Bangui, 1 June 2018.

¹⁵ Panel's mission to Sibut, 25 May 2018. Confidential document received by the Panel on 18 June 2018.

¹⁶ Document provided by presidential security adviser to the Panel, 23 June 2018.

¹⁷ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 26 January 2018.

¹⁸ <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/2127/sanctions-list-materials>.

¹⁹ Available at <https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13212.doc.htm>.

28. On 29 June 2018, the Government of Uganda requested that “the United Nations Security Council and/or the Panel of Experts assist and relocate Mr. Bozizé to a third country” in order to “avoid any speculation or innuendos” regarding the implementation by Uganda of Security Council resolutions.

29. Annex 2.4 provides additional information on travel ban violations by François Bozizé, which indicate that he is most likely travelling with other counterfeit travel documents. It also includes information shared by Ethiopian Airlines on 23 March 2018 regarding the travel itinerary of Mr. Bozizé for May 2017, as cited in the Panel’s 2017 midterm report (see S/2017/639, para. 35). The Panel is grateful for the continued cooperation of Ethiopian Airlines in that regard. Information on travel ban violations by the sanctioned individual Nouredine Adam is also provided in annex 2.4.

Lack of implementation of the asset freeze by national authorities

30. On 24 March 2018, Charles Armel Doubane, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central African Republic, informed the Panel that the issue of the asset freeze had been discussed, for the first time, by the Council of Ministers in early 2018.²⁰ The discussion had been initiated following the many letters that the Panel and the Chair of the Committee had addressed to the national authorities since December 2015 underlining the need to implement the asset freeze with regard to the listed individuals and entities. However, no decision or action was taken during or after the meeting, and therefore the Central African authorities continue to be in violation of their international obligations under Security Council resolutions.

III. Political process

A. African Union Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and other mediation efforts

31. The African Union Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, which began its activities in November 2017, has achieved some traction towards meeting the objectives set out in its road map. Through meetings in Bangui and several rounds of field visits in the country (see annex 3.1), the African Union’s panel of facilitators documented grievances that now form the basis of discussion for the planned dialogue aimed at concluding a peace agreement between the Government and the 14 armed groups. In the aftermath of “Operation Sukula” (see paras. 49–56 below), the panel of facilitators conducted additional field visits with the aim of confirming the armed groups’ commitment to the peace process. At the time of reporting, neither the date nor the venue of the dialogue had been agreed upon.

32. In accordance with the timetable adopted under the African Union Initiative, a series of workshops and training seminars are being organized to prepare for the upcoming dialogue and build the capacity of the main stakeholders, including the panel of facilitators, the Government, the 14 armed groups and civil society.

33. In parallel with the African Union Initiative, mediation efforts are also being undertaken at the local level, including by MINUSCA, the national authorities and religious leaders. Those initiatives are aimed at establishing a favourable environment that addresses local conflict dynamics, involving various actors (armed groups, local authorities, civil society and religious groups) and taking various formal or informal forms.

²⁰ Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Charles Armel Doubane, Bangui, 24 March 2018.

34. While the agreement signed in Bouar on 15 December 2017 was initiated by MINUSCA and involved armed groups (see paras. 94–95 below) and local authorities, the Bangassou agreement of 9 April 2018 was initiated by the religious platform and involved self-defence groups as well as internally displaced persons, civil society and local authorities (see annex 3.2).²¹ Other initiatives were concluded in Bossangoa and Bambari without the signing of formal agreements.

35. The Government is also engaging with armed groups through the President's national security adviser, a Russian national appointed as part of the cooperation between the Governments of the Central African Republic and the Russian Federation, who met on several occasions with leaders of armed groups to discuss questions related to, among other things, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, national reconciliation and the sharing of revenues from the exploitation of natural resources among local and national authorities.²² However, some armed group leaders informed the Panel that they regarded those discussions not as direct talks with the Government, but rather as negotiations with a foreign partner of the Government.²³

36. The Panel is of the view that the multiplicity of actors involved in mediation-related activities can be an asset. However, the lack of coordination by those actors with the African Union Initiative could be counterproductive, as it sends mixed messages to the armed groups.

B. Engagement of armed groups in the African Union Initiative

37. Most armed group leaders continue to express support for the African Union Initiative. However, their commitment to cease violence still remains to be demonstrated. During a number of meetings between the African Union panel of facilitators and armed groups, such as those held in Ndélé on 27 March 2018, armed groups demonstrated their military might by appearing at meetings with a large number of heavily armed elements (see annex 6.3).

38. The Panel also notes that the acquisition of military equipment by national defence and security forces has led to waves of rearmament by some ex-Séléka factions (see para. 81 below) who believe that the Government is preparing for a war against them.²⁴ While these groups do not question their commitment to the African Union Initiative, leaders of ex-Séléka factions confided to the Panel that, in the absence of a political agreement, they consider ongoing efforts aimed at demobilization, disarmament and reintegration and security sector reform to be a provocation. According to them, the goal of a political agreement is precisely to set out the conditions for the implementation of such reforms.

39. Members of armed groups have also used the opportunity of meetings with the African Union panel of facilitators to reiterate their traditional requests vis-à-vis the Government and international partners. For example, the Front Populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) issued a communiqué underlining, inter alia, the need for: (a) the lifting of sanctions against its leaders and a guarantee that there will be no prosecution of FPRC leaders who are committed to peace; (b) the conclusion of a political agreement in advance of any new deployment of FACA; (c) the reform of FACA, including through the integration of ex-combatants; and (d) the establishment of a system for ensuring that mineral-producing areas receive a

²¹ Meetings with confidential source, Bangui, 14 May and 15 June 2018.

²² Meeting with presidential security adviser, Bangui, 3 June 2018.

²³ Meeting with Abdoulaye Hissène, Kaga Bandoro, 1 May 2018; meetings with UPC leaders, Bangui, 6 May 2018.

²⁴ Meeting with Noureddine Adam, Birao, 23 January 2018.

fair share of revenues from the exploitation of natural resources (see annex 3.3). However, the African Union panel made it clear that grievances could be made only within the framework of the Constitution and previously signed agreements, in particular those concluded at the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation, held in May 2015 (see S/2015/344).

IV. Regional dynamics

40. In recent months, various factors have led to an increase in regional insecurity in Central Africa. Much of the strife is related to cross-border dynamics, including seasonal cattle migration, the cross-border movement of foreign fighters and the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons and natural resources. The Panel describes a number of recent regional developments in the paragraphs below.

A. Transborder issues

Central African Republic-Cameroon border

41. Insecurity at the border between the Central African Republic and Cameroon is fuelled by banditry, seasonal cattle migration, the movement of non-State armed actors and the illicit trafficking of natural resources. The presence of refugee camps along the border with Cameroon has compounded those problems, as some Central African nationals living in the camps have allegedly been involved in illicit activities, including the attempted coup d'état in January 2018 in Equatorial Guinea.²⁵ On 12 March 2018, insecurity in the border area prompted the Cameroonian authorities to establish a special infantry brigade (the 12th motorized infantry brigade) in eastern Cameroon, with headquarters in Bertoua.²⁶

Central African Republic-Chad border

42. The border between the Central African Republic and Chad has been officially closed since May 2014. Between December 2017 and May 2018, owing to fighting between the armed groups Mouvement national pour la libération de la Centrafrique (MNLC) and Révolution et justice in Ouham and Ouham-Pendé Prefectures, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) registered nearly 30,000 new Central African refugees in the Goré area in Chad.²⁷ This was in addition to reports of an alleged presence of Chadian fighters who were being recruited by ex-Séléka factions, as well as reports of arms trafficking from Chadian territory (see, for example, S/2017/639, paras. 64–69).

Central African Republic-Sudan border

43. During the Panel's mission to Ndélé in April 2018, the sub-prefect, the Sultan and civilians voiced concerns about the recent infiltration of Sudanese fighters and an increase in arms trafficking in the area (see para. 81 below).²⁸

²⁵ Meetings with military and diplomatic sources, New York, 14 March, and Bangui, 23 March 2018.

²⁶ Meeting with diplomatic source, New York, 14 March 2018.

²⁷ UNHCR report, 30 November 2017 and 31 May 2018.

²⁸ Panel's mission to Ndélé and Akroussoulbak, 3–5 April 2018.

B. Fighters from the region

44. In its 2017 midterm report (S/2017/639), the Panel cited the arrest, in Bangui on 9 June 2017, of two Congolese nationals, Freddy Libeba Baongoli and Alexandre Mitchiabu Mabiji. They identified themselves as members of an armed insurgency led by John Tshibangu, a former army colonel of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo who had deserted in 2012 and had subsequently been planning a rebellion against the national authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see S/2017/639, para. 99). Attempts by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to bring about the pair's extradition did not succeed. On 17 January, the two Congolese nationals escaped from prison in Bangui and returned to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.²⁹

45. The Panel was informed that Tshibangu had been hosted by FPRC in Birao between 13 and 21 June 2017,³⁰ reportedly with a view to purchasing weapons using FPRC networks in the Sudan.³¹ He was later arrested in the United Republic of Tanzania, on 30 January 2018.

46. The regional threat posed by foreign fighters reached a peak in January 2018 when the Government of Equatorial Guinea announced that it had uncovered an attempted coup d'état involving foreign fighters, including Central African nationals recruited in Bangui and in Cameroon, fuelling the perception that the Central African Republic was being used as a breeding ground for insecurity in neighbouring countries.³² The Government of the Central African Republic has set up a commission of inquiry on the matter (see annex 4).

C. Regional responses: commissions on cross-border issues

47. In an attempt to address various illicit cross-border activities, the Government of the Central African Republic has engaged neighbouring countries with a view to signing bilateral and trilateral agreements establishing commissions on cross-border issues.³³ From 2 to 4 September 2017, a tripartite meeting was held in Kinshasa among the Governments of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. Those in attendance recommended the creation of a special mixed commission in charge of political, diplomatic, defence and security matters pertaining to the three countries.³⁴

48. It is also planned that trilateral commissions will be established among the Central African Republic, Chad and the Sudan as well as among the Central African Republic, Cameroon and Chad. In addition, it is envisaged that bilateral commissions will be put in place between the Central African Republic and Cameroon and between the Central African Republic and Chad, as well as between the Central African Republic and the Sudan.³⁵ However, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central African Republic told the Panel that the limited engagement of neighbouring

²⁹ See <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180124-exclus-rfi-freddy-libeba-rebelle-congolais-cavale-exprime>, accessed on 3 February 2018.

³⁰ Meeting with confidential source, Birao, 24 January 2018.

³¹ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 24 January 2018.

³² Meetings with members of the diplomatic community in Bangui, January and February 2018.

³³ Meeting with Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central African Republic, Bangui, 24 March 2018.

³⁴ See <http://smc.sd/fr/la-rdc-prete-signer-laccord-portant-creation-dune-commission-mixte-speciale-rdc-rea-soudan-du-sud/>, accessed on 26 April 2018.

³⁵ Meetings with Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central African Republic, Bangui, 24 March and 19 June 2018.

countries was undermining progress in this field (see recommendation in para. 119 (c) below).³⁶

V. Renewed violence in Bangui and its consequences

49. "Operation Sukula", jointly conducted in Bangui on 7 and 8 April 2018 by MINUSCA, internal security forces and FACA, marked the beginning of a series of violent events and a resurgence of tensions between communities that had not been seen in the capital since the outbreak of violence in October 2016 (see S/2016/1032, paras. 82–91). The operation targeted the bases of self-defence groups in the predominantly Muslim PK5 neighbourhood to allow for the installation of internal security force units and a MINUSCA temporary operating base in the area (see annex 5.1 for the chronology of the events).

A. Humanitarian and communal consequences of fighting

50. Between April and May 2018, approximately 70 people were killed and 330 injured in Bangui alone.³⁷ It is likely that the death toll is underestimated, given that casualties resulting from clashes after "Operation Sukula" in the PK5 and Castor neighbourhoods were not included in the official account. Conflict dynamics reminiscent of the violence of 2013 and 2014 reappeared (see S/2014/452, paras. 104–112): civilians were assaulted because of their religion or ethnicity, health facilities and places of worship were attacked, and humanitarian assistance was obstructed.

51. During "Operation Sukula", on the night of 7 April, two people were killed and 45 injured, many by stray bullets.³⁸ MINUSCA was not in a position to implement the planned contingency measures for the protection of civilians (see annex 5.1). During the first phase of the operation, between 2 a.m. and 5 a.m., several local houses were searched for members of self-defence groups; none of the leaders were arrested.

52. After "Operation Sukula", MINUSCA and national security forces installed a cordon around the third district,³⁹ often supported by local youth from the surrounding areas, as observed by the Panel.⁴⁰ While it was set up for security reasons, the cordon contributed to the isolation of the PK5 neighbourhood, mainly in terms of the provision of humanitarian assistance and supply to the local market.

53. On 10 April 2018, a patrol of Rwandan peacekeepers intervened to calm down an angry crowd mixed with self-defence group elements that was approaching the police station in the fifth district. This triggered four hours of violent clashes inside the third district that left more than 30 people killed and 100 injured, most likely including a significant number of civilian casualties. The Panel interviewed 10 civilians who were either victims themselves or had relatives who were victims. Furthermore, one Rwandan peacekeeper lost his life and eight others were injured during the clashes.

54. The events that occurred at the Church of Notre Dame de Fatima in Bangui should be regarded as part of the continuum of events following "Operation Sukula". On 1 May at around 11 a.m. at a checkpoint close to the church premises, local policemen attempted to arrest an individual linked to the self-defence group of Nimeri

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports, 16 April 2018 and 7 May 2018.

³⁸ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs report, 16 April 2018.

³⁹ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 18 June 2018.

⁴⁰ Panel's visit in Bangui, April–May 2018.

Matar whose alias is "Force".⁴¹ When self-defence groups from the PK5 neighbourhood responded, policemen escaped inside the church compound,⁴² where more than 1,000 people were participating in a ceremony. Self-defence groups then surrounded the church and besieged it for two hours, using automatic weapons and grenades. As a result, 30 people, including a priest, were killed and 185 injured.

55. The response of Bangui's population to the events that occurred at the Church of Notre Dame de Fatima was extremely violent and fuelled by anti-Muslim sentiment. An angry crowd that brought the body of the priest to the presidential palace in protest lynched two Muslims of Senegalese nationality in the Lakouanga neighbourhood. In the aftermath, two mosques were looted, in the Lakouanga and Ngaragba neighbourhoods.

56. Meanwhile, several hundred outraged people broke into the Bangui Community Hospital, where most of the wounded had been transferred. The crowd first stoned to death a Muslim caretaker of a patient hospitalized in the facility, and then moved to the trauma ward in search of the other Muslim patients, who had locked themselves in a room.⁴³ In addition, wounded patients from the Henry Dunant health facility in the PK5 neighbourhood could not be transferred to specialized health facilities in the capital for 10 days, which resulted in the deaths of several patients.⁴⁴ According to MINUSCA, the security situation prevented the creation of the humanitarian corridor requested by humanitarian actors.⁴⁵

B. Incitement to discrimination and violence

57. The turmoil in Bangui has revived and exacerbated discourses inciting discrimination and violence on an ethnic or religious basis. In April and May 2018, newspapers and social media were flooded by discourse expressing hostility towards the PK5 neighbourhood and its population with a twofold objective: first, to create a narrative of discrimination associating all Central African Muslims with foreign mercenaries who had come to destabilize the country; and second, to directly incite others to commit violence against them (see annex 5.2). Between 1 April and 31 May 2018, MINUSCA identified 39 articles inciting discrimination, hostility and violence that had been published in 11 national newspapers (see annex 5.3).

58. The name of the military operation conducted in the PK5 neighbourhood unintentionally contributed to the rhetoric of the radicals, because the Sango word *sukula* means "cleaning". Media appeals to starve, "clean out" or destroy the PK5 neighbourhood have been made since "Operation Sukula", but their intensity substantially increased after the events at the Church of Notre Dame de Fatima, when it became common to label self-defence groups, and sometimes the Muslim community as a whole, as "terrorists" (see annex 5.4).

59. Similar hateful narratives have also been adopted by political figures. For example, several members of the National Assembly made troubling statements during the Prime Minister's question time on 1 May, immediately after the events at the Church of Notre Dame de Fatima. In particular, the member of Parliament from Bimbo, Sylvain Ngoni, stated, "Today, PK5 has become Chad" and "I am wondering whether we should burn PK5 down together someday" (see annex 5.5). The session, in the Sango language, was broadcast live by Radio Centrafrique.

⁴¹ Meeting with direct witness, Bangui, 3 May 2018.

⁴² Confidential report, 2 May 2018. Meeting with direct witnesses, Bangui, 3 and 8 May 2018.

⁴³ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 5 May 2018.

⁴⁴ Phone conversation and exchange of email with confidential source, 3 May 2018.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

60. Annex 5.6 provides information on the preventive activities and decisions of the High Council for Communications, which is supported by MINUSCA (see recommendation in para. 119 (d) below).

C. Armed militias in the PK5 neighbourhood

61. Five main self-proclaimed self-defence groups are currently active in the PK5 neighbourhood and were targeted by "Operation Sukula". They are identified by the names (or aliases) of their current or former leaders: "Force", "You", Moussa Danda, "Apo" and "50/50" (see annex 5.6). Their activities are largely criminal and are limited to the PK5 area. Occasional clashes between these groups occur as they are competing for taxation with respect to the PK5 market and transport operators.⁴⁶

62. According to MINUSCA, "Operation Sukula" was launched in response to long-standing appeals by merchants for freedom of movement and an end to the illegal taxation imposed by the self-defence groups in the area. However, some PK5 community representatives believe that the launching of the operation ran counter to the ongoing dialogue with MINUSCA, which was aimed at peacefully resolving security issues in the area (see annex 5.7).

63. The relationship between the residents of the PK5 neighbourhood and the self-defence groups is complex. Representatives of some communities, including victims of the groups' actions, told the Panel that the existence of the groups and their acts of violence are "the price to pay for feeling protected", as the inhabitants live in fear of a recurrence of the violence that targeted the area in 2014 and 2015. They also recognize that MINUSCA patrols play a positive role in reducing the influence of the groups.

64. In the eyes of some communities, the relevance of the self-defence groups is based mainly on a feeling of mistrust towards the national security forces that previously played a role in acts of violence against the Muslim community (see S/2014/452, annex 5.4).⁴⁷

65. Several witnesses told the Panel that, during the night of "Operation Sukula" (7 April), a group of individuals wearing various uniforms, whom they described as FACA elements and who were not part of the operation, entered the PK5 neighbourhood through the Fondo area and moved in the direction of the Senegalese neighbourhood. Reportedly, the alleged FACA elements clashed with local residents and looted their dwellings.⁴⁸

66. Violent clashes also occurred during the week following "Operation Sukula" next to the border between the Castor and PK5 neighbourhoods. FACA and internal security forces, supported by anti-balaka groups, reportedly led by the sanctioned individual Alfred Yékatom, then clashed with self-defence groups from PK5.⁴⁹

67. These events deepened the divide between the population and the national security forces, and reinforced the role of the self-defence groups in the community. Either during "Operation Sukula" or the ensuing violence, civilians joined the self-defence groups and took part in the clashes.⁵⁰

68. The recent events have elevated the profile of the self-defence group leaders; in particular, a number of ex-Séléka leaders attempted to reconnect with the self-defence

⁴⁶ Confidential report, 23 February 2018.

⁴⁷ Meeting with PK5 Crisis Committee, Bangui, 13–15 June 2018.

⁴⁸ Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 6 May 2018 and 14 June 2018.

⁴⁹ Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 13, 14 and 15 June 2018.

⁵⁰ Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 5 and 6 May 2018, 14 June 2018.

group leaders to reinforce their position in the capital.⁵¹ While self-defence group leaders have refused to be associated with ex-Séléka factions, the treatment of their concerns remains related to a global political agreement. For example, "Force" affirmed his willingness to be part of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation and security sector reform processes, his main objective being his reintegration into FACA.⁵²

D. Weaponry and trafficking in the PK5 neighbourhood

69. Annex 5.8 provides additional information on weaponry in the PK5 neighbourhood and the wide availability of conventional weapons and ammunition in the capital.

VI. Developments in areas under the influence of ex-Séléka factions

A. Hardening of the positions of ex-Séléka factions

70. The relationship between the Government and ex-Séléka factions has become increasingly strained. The hardening of ex-Séléka positions is based largely on a perception that the Government, which gained operational strength through its recent acquisition of weaponry (see paras. 20–23 above), is willing to place priority on a military solution and is aligning its position with individuals whom the Panel described as "warmongers" in its 2017 final report (see S/2017/1023, paras. 62–65).

Continuing quest of the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique for Séléka reunification

71. In view of the upcoming dialogue under the African Union Initiative, FPRC, under the influence of Abdoulaye Hissène, intensified its pressure on the Government.⁵³ In early April 2018, Mr. Hissène and FPRC combatants from Ndélé moved southward with the intention of positioning themselves closer to the capital. They stopped in Kaga Bandoro, as UPC elements, who initially had been supposed to move with them towards Sibut (180 km from Bangui), had never arrived.

72. In Kaga Bandoro, Abdoulaye Hissène lobbied the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) and UPC to join his initiative and move towards Sibut, emphasizing the discontent shared by all ex-Séléka factions with regard to the Government. He also encouraged the Muslim communities throughout the country to support their efforts, playing on the growing mistrust felt towards the Government as a result of "Operation Sukula" (see annex 6.1).⁵⁴

Alignment of the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique with the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique

73. On 1 May, the Panel met with "General" Mahamat Al-Khatim and political representatives of MPC, who categorically rejected the plan of FPRC to move towards Sibut.⁵⁵ However, in the following days, after the MPC General Assembly in Kaga

⁵¹ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 6 May 2018.

⁵² Meeting with "Force", Bangui, 13 June 2018.

⁵³ Meeting with Abdoulaye Hissène, Kaga Bandoro, 1 May 2018.

⁵⁴ Meeting with confidential sources, Kaga Bandoro, 1 May 2018.

⁵⁵ Meeting with Al-Khatim, Kaga Bandoro, 2 May 2018.

Bandoro (held on 2 and 3 May 2018), a new political leadership was appointed and the group publicly expressed support for the FPRC strategy (see annex 6.2).

74. This shift can be explained by the sense of outrage existing within the “Arab” community, which constitutes the main base of support for MPC, and the participants in the Assembly as a result of President Touadéra’s declaration following the incident at the Church of Notre Dame de Fatima on 1 May.⁵⁶ President Touadéra then portrayed MPC as a government ally, while making statements considered to be discriminatory by the Muslim community.⁵⁷ MPC leader Mahamat Al-Khatim had to accept the change in position on the part of MPC. Al-Khatim, whose main concern remains the recognition by national authorities of his control over the Kaga Bandoro area,⁵⁸ has no interest in contesting the Government’s legitimacy, but maintaining his leadership position also requires that he take into account the views of his followers and his community.

Continuing ambiguity of the position of the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique

75. The position of UPC is more uncertain and complex. Although UPC did not officially express support for FPRC, it has kept the door open in that regard. While UPC combatants were positioned around Kaga Bandoro and Sibut in the event that FPRC should move towards Sibut, UPC remains sceptical of Hissène’s strategy, which is regarded as lacking clarity, including with regard to the role assigned to UPC.⁵⁹

76. Since the Ippy agreement of October 2017 (see S/2017/1023, paras. 136–137), UPC has pursued the normalization of its relations with other ex-Séléka factions. “General” Zacharia Damane, leader of the Rassemblement patriotique pour le renouveau de la Centrafrique, and Ali Darassa met in Bria on 3 May 2018 to conclude an agreement between the Goula and Fulani communities. The agreement was aimed at guaranteeing freedom of movement for both communities, which reinforced the capacity of UPC to acquire supplies from the territory of the Sudan through Ouadda, which is under Damane’s control.

77. Still, UPC wants to appear to be a reasonable partner for the Government and the international community. For example, although it was involved in violent clashes with FACA soldiers in Bambari on 10 June, UPC finally agreed to let the FACA convoy reach Bangassou (see para. 19 above).⁶⁰ That decision triggered negative reactions from other ex-Séléka factions as well as within UPC.⁶¹ The rejection of any FACA deployment prior to the conclusion of a global agreement is a position common to all ex-Séléka factions (see para. 39 above).

“Nairobi group” and other possible alliances

78. Signatories to the Nairobi agreement (see S/2015/936, paras. 24–26) continue to share a common opposition to the Government. Anti-balaka factions, reportedly connected to Maxime Mokom and Jean-Francis Bozizé (see S/2016/1032, paras. 92–96), continue to coordinate their actions with FPRC.⁶² A delegation of six individuals representing Jean-Francis Bozizé reportedly met with Abdoulaye Hissène

⁵⁶ See <https://www.facebook.com/Renaissance.cf/posts/1658588347550650>, accessed on 28 June 2018.

⁵⁷ Meeting with confidential source, Kaga Bandoro, 2 May 2018.

⁵⁸ Meeting with Al-Khatim, Kaga Bandoro, 1 May 2018.

⁵⁹ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 13 June 2018.

⁶⁰ Confidential report, 18 June 2018.

⁶¹ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 13 June 2018.

⁶² Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 7 June 2018.

in Kaga Bandoro at the end of April 2018.⁶³ Both groups continue to share similar objectives, but their capacity to preserve their alliance remains fragile, especially in a context of intercommunal tensions.

79. Other Bangui-based actors, including politicians, reached out to FPRC to inform it of their unofficial support in an attempt to position themselves as possible partners should FPRC destabilize the Government. Some recently retired FACA soldiers are particularly active in offering their services to various armed groups opposing the Government.⁶⁴

Posture of the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique towards the international community

80. Ex-Séléka factions rarely conduct military operations against MINUSCA. However, after "Operation Sukula" and MINUSCA actions in Ndomété to prevent movement by FPRC towards Sibut, the group publicly accused the Mission of militarily supporting the Government against them and of losing its impartiality (see annex 6.1). FPRC leaders told the Panel that, if more joint operations by FACA and MINUSCA were to be conducted in or near areas under their control, direct confrontation might occur.⁶⁵

B. Ex-Séléka weaponry and trafficking

81. The recent acquisition of weaponry by the Government has created an incentive for the active rearmament of ex-Séléka factions. Armed group elements told the Panel that, since the Government had opted for the military option (training, rearming and attacking) instead of the political process, armed groups needed to be prepared.⁶⁶ Annex 6.3 provides information on the influx of weapons, including on the impact of the disarmament campaign launched by the Sudanese authorities in Darfur on the acquisition and purchase of military equipment by armed groups in the Central African Republic.

C. Establishment of parallel administration and taxation structures

82. The Panel has continued to observe the establishment of parallel administration structures by ex-Séléka factions (see, for example, S/2017/1023, paras. 153–155). Leaders of the groups told the Panel that the objectives of such structures were twofold: (a) to cope with the continued lack of State presence in areas under their control; and (b) to generate revenues to sustain the provision of public services for the population, including through the establishment of security forces.⁶⁷

83. Some ex-Séléka leaders claim that any activities in areas under their influence must have their agreement. For example, FPRC leaders told the Panel that the transit in May 2018 of the convoy transporting materiel for the construction of hospitals in Bria and Ouadda (see para. 13 above), as part of the cooperation between the Governments of the Central African Republic and the Russian Federation, as well as the provision of security to the convoy by FPRC combatants, had been accepted only in exchange for financial remuneration.⁶⁸ Representatives of the Russian Federation

⁶³ Meeting with confidential sources, Kaga Bandoro, 2 May 2018.

⁶⁴ Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui and other prefectures, May and June 2018.

⁶⁵ Meeting with MPC, FPRC and UPC leaders, Kaga Bandoro, 3 May 2018; Bria, 9 June 2018; and Bangui, 30 April 2018.

⁶⁶ Meetings with confidential sources, 27 March, 22 May and 4 and 16 June 2018.

⁶⁷ Meeting with Mahmat Seid, Bria, 10 June 2018.

⁶⁸ Meetings with FPRC leaders, Kaga Bandoro, 2 May 2018.

denied those allegations and underlined that the only incentive for cooperation by FPRC in allowing the convoy to pass through had been the provision of support to the population through the establishment of hospitals in areas under the armed groups' control.⁶⁹

Parallel administration by Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique in Haute-Kotto Prefecture

84. "General" Mahmat Seid, President of the Financial Management Committee of FPRC in Haute-Kotto Prefecture, told the Panel that his administration was divided into five branches, covering the following activities: the coffee trade, livestock farming, tax collection, customs and phytosanitary services. Annex 6.4 provides additional information on the Committee's taxation system and similar structures in other prefectures.

Diamond and gold trafficking in Bria

In spite of the suspension of exports of rough diamonds sourced in the area, some collectors still operate in Bria. This is the case with Patrick Kozungu-Yakangi, who was apprehended with undeclared diamonds in Bangui on 30 June 2017 and, thanks to his connections, freed a few days later (see S/2017/1023, paras. 159–162). His presence in Bria has been observed again since then, including in March 2018.^a

Some local leaders of FPRC, such as Mahmat Saleh and Haute-Kotto Zone Commander Damboucha Hissein, are also directly involved in illicit diamond trafficking.^b

^a Meeting with collectors and artisanal miners, Bria, 8–11 June 2018.

^b Ibid.

Parallel mining administration under the Front Populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique and the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique

85. Ex-Séléka factions have also established structures that specifically supervise mining activities and that mirror the official mining administration. FPRC, in Bria and Ndélé, and UPC, in Bambari, have appointed regional mining directors, established mining brigades and issued licences to miners and collectors (see annexes 6.5 and 6.6).

86. Representatives of the Government's mining administration were deployed in Bambari and Ndélé in December 2017 and February 2018, respectively, with a view to eventually declaring those areas "compliant" under the Kimberley Process.⁷⁰ Owing to the presence of armed groups, however, they are unable to fulfil their mission and supervise mining activities.

D. Impact of the fighting in Ouaka Prefecture on civilians, humanitarian actors and peacekeepers

87. Between January and June 2018, Ouaka Prefecture experienced a wave of instability that moved progressively from the periphery to Bambari town. The tight

⁶⁹ Meeting with representatives of the Russian Federation, Bangui, 13 June 2018.

⁷⁰ Meeting with Bambari regional mining director, Bangui, 12 June 2018. Meeting with mining administration, Ndélé, 5 April 2018.

links between communities and armed groups have often added complexity to the dynamics of the conflict.

Deadly cycle of violence along the Bambari-Ippy axis

88. The bloodiest incidents occurred in Tagbara and Seko, along the Bambari-Ippy axis (see map in annex 6.7). Since January 2018, while UPC has strengthened its control over the area with checkpoints and patrols, groups of anti-balaka combatants have reorganized in the surrounding areas. Around mid-March 2018, anti-balaka elements attacked a Fulani camp in Mbaidou, killing approximately 15 people, including women and children (see annex 6.8).⁷¹ In the early morning of 21 March, anti-balaka fighters coming from Yambelego and led by Edmond Obrou⁷² attacked the UPC base in Tagbara, executing Muslim civilians and burning several houses in the town. This provoked a violent response from UPC, which sent reinforcements from its bases in both Maloum and Ippy. UPC combatants from Maloum executed 17 civilians in and around St. Charles Lwanga Church in Seko,⁷³ including the priest, and set fire to a large number of houses in both Tagbara and Seko.

89. Two weeks later, the cycle of retaliations restarted. On 2 April, UPC arrested several individuals accused of associating with anti-balaka groups and handed over some of them to MINUSCA peacekeepers in Tagbara. In the early morning of 3 April, several hundred anti-balaka fighters coming from Yambelego attacked the MINUSCA base in Tagbara. To respond to the aggression, MINUSCA recalled its armoured vehicle that had been stationed at St. Charles Lwanga Church in Seko after the 21 March attack.⁷⁴ As a result, UPC reinforcements coming from Maloum found the way open for a second retaliation against the local population, killing 23 civilians.⁷⁵ The attack in Tagbara left 1 Mauritanian peacekeeper killed, 11 others injured and some 33 anti-balaka fighters killed (see annex 6.9).⁷⁶

90. Annex 6.10 provides information on attacks against peacekeepers.

Violence in Bambari

91. While Bambari had experienced relative calm since it was declared an armed-group-free zone in February 2017 (see S/2017/639, para. 53), UPC had continued to be present in town by adopting a low-profile strategy. On 14 and 15 May 2018, as a result of intercommunal clashes supported by armed groups, 9 civilians were killed and 9 injured and some 7,000 people were displaced.⁷⁷ At night, opportunistic lootings of the offices of three international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and a significant number of local associations, as well as private houses and public buildings, were carried out by members of the local population. Although no physical aggression was reported, the response capacity of humanitarian agencies was seriously affected.⁷⁸ Later, after the situation had calmed down, a new series of extremely sophisticated robberies, well planned and professionally executed by armed elements, targeted several NGOs, forcing them to reduce or suspend their activities.⁷⁹

⁷¹ Meeting with confidential source, Bambari, 30 April 2018, and with internally displaced person representatives, Tagbara, 1 May 2018.

⁷² Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 28 April 2018, and with internally displaced person representatives, Tagbara and Seko, 1 May 2018.

⁷³ Meeting with health workers, Seko, 1 May 2018.

⁷⁴ Meeting with confidential source, Tagbara, 1 May 2018.

⁷⁵ Meeting with health workers, Seko, 1 May 2018.

⁷⁶ Confidential report, 4 April 2018.

⁷⁷ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs report, 16 May 2018.

⁷⁸ Meeting with NGO representatives, Bangui, 11 June 2018.

⁷⁹ Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 9 and 15 June 2018.

92. On 29 and 30 May 2018, violent clashes between UPC elements, on one side, and MINUSCA and internal security forces, on the other, resulted in more than 20 deaths.⁸⁰ The influx of a significant number of wounded UPC fighters raised tensions around the city's hospital. On 6 June, dozens of UPC elements broke into the facility to extract one of their comrades, shooting inside the building. All the Muslim patients fled in fear of retaliation. Shortly thereafter, a group of local anti-balaka fighters entered the hospital, looking for UPC fighters, and pillaged the building. Attacks on medical facilities and threats against health personnel have drastically reduced access to health care in Bambari, especially for the Muslim community.⁸¹

VII. Developments in western Central African Republic

A. Activities of armed groups

Coalition Siriri, a new actor with strong ambitions

93. In Mambéré-Kadéï Prefecture, a new armed group called Coalition Siriri was created in late 2017. Its members, mainly Fulani, have strong ties to UPC.⁸² Their proclaimed goal is to protect cattle owners targeted by local anti-balaka fighters.⁸³ Since January 2018, however, through cooperation with elements from the Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain (FDPC), Coalition Siriri has expanded its positions in southern Nana-Mambéré Prefecture to increase opportunities for illegal taxation on transhumance and mining activities (see paras. 102–103 below).

Agreement between Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation and the anti-balaka group led by the Ndalé brothers

94. In Nana-Mambéré Prefecture, Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation and the anti-balaka group led by the Ndalé brothers (see S/2017/1023, paras. 202–208) concluded a peace agreement on 15 December 2017.⁸⁴

95. The accord has allowed for a ceasefire and a clear division of territories between the two groups, where both maintain a lucrative system for illegal taxation on transhumance activities.

Conflict between the Mouvement national pour la libération de la Centrafrique and Révolution et justice

96. On 28 December 2017, violent clashes erupted between former allies Révolution et justice and the Mouvement national pour la libération de la Centrafrique (a former local branch of MPC) (see S/2017/1023, paras. 194–197) around Paoua.

97. Despite “Operation Mbaranga”, launched by MINUSCA in January 2018, and the subsequent suspension of the clashes between the two groups, the area remains insecure.

98. Annex 7.1 provides additional information on the activities of the above-mentioned armed groups.

⁸⁰ Confidential report, 30 May 2018.

⁸¹ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 15 June 2018.

⁸² Meeting with UPC representative, Bangui, 27 April 2018. Confidential report, 26 March 2018.

⁸³ Confidential report, 26 March 2018.

⁸⁴ Confidential report, 18 December 2017.

B. Human rights violations as a consequence of insecurity

99. The situation in the Bossangoa-Markounda-Nanga-Boguila triangle illustrates the impact of the recent political-military changes in the area on civilians and humanitarian actors (see annex 7.2). On 3 March 2018, a case of mass rape was reported in the village of Kiriwiri (Ouham Prefecture).⁸⁵ The Panel's findings demonstrate that a significant number of women living in the Nana-Bakassa-Bouaye area were raped and sexually assaulted in small groups and on different occasions over the past two months by a group of herders led by an individual named Balewa (see annex 7.3).

100. Furthermore, on 25 February 2018, six humanitarian workers were carjacked and brutally killed between Defei and Markounda. The Panel gathered testimonies pointing to six armed elements reportedly under the direct command of local MPC leader Abdallah (see annex 7.4).⁸⁶

C. Multiplication of mining companies and its security implications

101. Since early 2016, a number of foreign operators have obtained permits to exploit diamond and gold sites in the Central African Republic in a semi-mechanical or industrial manner. Such investments provide tax revenues to the State. At the same time, in areas with limited State authority, activities of all economic operators may generate revenue for armed groups through racketeering, illegal taxation or possibly, as was the case in 2016 with the private security company FIT Protection (see S/2016/694, paras. 85–89), direct arrangements between companies and armed groups.

Racketeering against mining companies in the Abba area of Nana-Mambéré Prefecture

102. On 5 and 6 January 2018, armed combatants from Coalition Siriri and FDPC threatened workers of three mining companies operating in the Abba area of Nana-Mambéré Prefecture, namely, IMC, Zighu Mining and Tieng Pao. Representatives of local authorities and individuals involved in the mediation between the companies and armed groups told the Panel that the companies had had to pay FCFA 2 million (\$3,750) to the combatants so that they would agree to leave the area.⁸⁷

103. While Tieng Pao's managers deny having provided any financial compensation to armed groups on that occasion, they acknowledged having paid FCFA 3 million (\$5,650) to armed elements in November and December 2017 as a result of a similar incident.⁸⁸ The Panel was unable to meet with managers of IMC and Zighu Mining, who were absent from the country during the Panel's missions to the Central African Republic.

104. Annex 7.5 includes information on the use of anti-balaka combatants, as well as internal security forces and FACA elements, as security providers for economic operators, including mining companies.

⁸⁵ See <http://www.msf.org/en/article/central-african-republic-survivors-describe-mass-rape-ordeal-outside-bossangoa>, consulted on 26 June 2018.

⁸⁶ Meeting with confidential sources, Markounda, 25–26 March 2018.

⁸⁷ Meetings with Abba sub-prefect, gendarme officer, mining administration and confidential sources, Bouar and Abba, 26–28 March 2018.

⁸⁸ Meeting with Tieng Pao managers, Bangui, 30 March 2018.

Bossangoa area

105. Annex 7.6 provides information on the arrival of mining companies in the Bossangoa area, an anti-balaka stronghold.

D. Poaching and ivory trafficking in Dzanga Sangha national reserve⁸⁹**VIII. Trafficking dynamics and routes: arms and natural resources****A. Bangui-based individuals organizing arms trafficking in vehicles escorted by the Mission**

106. On 29 January 2018, UPC members informed the Panel that they had stopped and searched vehicles of Ecolog International escorted by MINUSCA in front of the MINUSCA camp in Ippy,⁹⁰ as a result of which 1,727 rounds of hunting ammunition from the Manufacture d'armes et de cartouches du Congo (MACC), 602 packages of tramadol and 1.5 kg of marijuana had been found. Six drivers and assistant drivers had been arrested, of whom four had been sentenced for illegal possession of ammunition and prohibited goods or complicity in such activities.⁹¹

107. According to witnesses, one of the convicted persons, Didier Zala, regularly uses the trucks of Ecolog International, a MINUSCA contractor, to smuggle hunting ammunition to the towns of Bria, Bambari and Ippy. Zala allegedly purchases the ammunition in Lopola, Congo, and sells it to hunters and anti-balaka fighters (see annex 8.1).⁹² The Panel continues to investigate whether convoys escorted by MINUSCA are used by traffickers to smuggle arms and ammunition as well as natural resources.

B. Measures taken by the Congo to counter the illegal export of ammunition from the Manufacture d'armes et de cartouches du Congo to the Central African Republic

108. MACC hunting ammunition, which is used by anti-balaka fighters during military operations such as the one carried out in Tagbara (see paras. 88–89 above), continues to be smuggled into the country through the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo⁹³ (see S/2017/1023, paras. 106, 107 and 248) and to be sold throughout the country (see annex 8.2).

109. The Panel visited Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire in the Congo to sensitize the Government and the ammunition manufacturer regarding the illicit import and use of MACC ammunition by anti-balaka fighters in the Central African Republic and the fact that boxes of the ammunition do not contain the information necessary for proper tracing as required under the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention) (see S/2017/1023, para. 250).⁹⁴ Following the visit, the Congolese authorities adopted certain measures aimed at better regulating the sale of such ammunition (see annex 8.3).

⁸⁹ See annex 7.7.

⁹⁰ Phone conversation with UPC members, 29 January 2018.

⁹¹ Judgment of the Grand Court of Bambari, 14 February 2018.

⁹² Meetings with five confidential sources, Bangui, 28 and 30 May and 4 and 18 June 2018.

⁹³ Meetings with Customs officers, Bangui, 1 and 16 June 2018.

⁹⁴ Panel's mission to Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire, 16–22 April 2018.

C. Kimberley Process, the diamond trade and diamond trafficking

110. During the period from January to June 2018, approximately 74,000 carats of rough diamonds were officially exported from the Central African Republic.⁹⁵ This figure includes stockpiles that were accumulated by buying houses in previous years (when exports were suspended) and that were exported in early 2018 (see annex 8.8). Less than 2,000 carats have actually been submitted for export and legally exported since the beginning of 2018, which is a very small amount.

111. In contrast to the positive dynamics described in the Panel's 2017 final report (see S/2017/1023, paras. 224–226), this dramatic decrease in the legal diamond trade is related to the closing of most buying house offices in the provinces since the second half of 2017.⁹⁶ Buying house managers told the Panel that those closures had been due to the lack of cash resulting from delays in export clearance under the Kimberley Process monitoring system.⁹⁷ Members of the Kimberley Process monitoring team indicate that such delays result from the difficulties encountered by buying houses and national authorities in gathering the documentation required for the approval of exports under the operational framework of June 2015.

112. The current lack of buying houses strongly contributes to the resumption of diamond-smuggling activities in the western part of the country, as artisanal miners and collectors are left with no option other than to either cease their activities or sell their diamonds illegally.

113. Although no armed groups are controlling mining sites in the areas declared “compliant” under the Kimberley Process, the Panel notes that most anti-balaka leaders in Mambéré-Kadéï Prefecture are involved in diamond-related activities. These include “Awilo”, “Mopao” and Kevin Padom, alias “Kempo”.⁹⁸ Many have traditionally worked in the diamond sector and continue to do so for their own benefit; the Panel did not collect evidence indicating that these individuals contribute to the funding of the broader anti-balaka movement.

114. The Government informed the Panel that most sub-prefectures in the southwestern part of the country, except a few where insecurity remains high, such as Amada-Gaza, would soon be submitted for approval to the Kimberley Process monitoring team.⁹⁹

D. Gold exploitation and trafficking

115. Official exports of gold from the Central African Republic continue to increase (see S/2017/1023, para. 223). The record established in 2017 (108 kg) is likely to be surpassed in 2018, as 65 kg were already exported during the period from January to May 2018.¹⁰⁰

116. The traceability of the production is, however, very limited, and the greatest part of the production continues to be exported illegally (see S/2017/1023, paras. 158 and 230). Among neighbouring countries where gold is smuggled, Cameroon occupies a place of choice, as gold is reportedly purchased at a much higher price there

⁹⁵ Official data of the Central African Republic.

⁹⁶ Panel's mission to Berbérati and Nola, 11–16 January 2018.

⁹⁷ Meetings with buying house managers, Bangui, 17 and 21 January 2018.

⁹⁸ Meeting with artisanal miners and confidential sources, Berbérati, 11 January 2018.

⁹⁹ Meeting with the Minister of Mines, Bangui, 5 June 2018.

¹⁰⁰ Official export data of the Central African Republic.

(FCFA 23,000–24,000, or \$40–\$44 per gram) than in Bangui (FCFA 20,000–22,000, or \$35–\$39) and even, at times, than on the world market.¹⁰¹

E. Diamond/gold trafficking and lack of control at airports

117. Traffickers use mainly roads to bring gold and diamonds from areas of extraction to Bangui or to neighbouring countries. However, air transportation remains a preferred mode of transport for bringing goods to Bangui from areas with unsafe roads, such as Bria (see S/2017/1023, paras. 159–169). Air transportation is also used to smuggle gold and diamonds out of the country from Bangui international airport.¹⁰²

118. The Special Anti-Fraud Unit is absent from all airfields in the country except Bangui airport, where search controls are exclusively conducted with respect to departing passengers but not arriving passengers, even those coming from gold- and diamond-producing areas (see recommendation in para. 119 (e) below).¹⁰³ As observed by the Panel, traffickers departing from Bangui can also arrange to receive unverified packages directly on the airport tarmac before boarding an aircraft.

IX. Recommendations

119. The Panel recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic:

(a) Encourage MINUSCA and the national authorities to develop a standard procedure for the inspection, processing and stockpile management of exempted military equipment upon its arrival in the territory of the Central African Republic (see para. 20 above and annex 2.2);

(b) Call upon the Government of South Sudan to provide information to the Committee on the South Sudanese diplomatic passport used by listed individual François Bozizé and the cancellation of that passport (see para. 27 above);

(c) Encourage the Government of the Central African Republic and neighbouring countries to establish and/or activate (or reactivate) commissions to address transborder issues, including matters that are relevant to the United Nations sanctions regime or affect insecurity in the Central African Republic, such as the implementation of the travel ban on sanctioned individuals, transhumance, or trafficking in arms and natural resources (see paras. 47–48 above);

(d) Encourage the High Council for Communications of the Central African Republic to continue to strengthen the monitoring, reporting and sanctioning of public discourse inciting discrimination, hatred and violence, in particular on an ethnic or religious basis, that undermines the peace, stability or security of the Central African Republic (see para. 60 above);

(e) Encourage the national authorities of the Central African Republic to strengthen controls with respect to passengers and their luggage implemented by Special Anti-Fraud Unit staff at airports, especially passengers arriving at Bangui airport from airfields located in diamond- and gold-producing areas (see para. 118 above).

¹⁰¹ Meeting with artisanal miners and collectors, Bossangoa, 24 March; Bouar, 26 March; and Bambari, 1 May 2018.

¹⁰² Meeting with traffickers, Bangui, 21 March 2018, and Bria, 9 June 2018.

¹⁰³ Meeting with Special Anti-Fraud Unit, Bangui, 1 April 2018.


Annexes

**Annexes to the midterm report of the Panel of Experts
on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to
Security Council resolution 2399 (2018)**

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Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Annex 2.1: National security and defence forces: training, equipment and deployment.

1. Additional information on the training of FACA by the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM)

Since September 2016, EUTM has trained a total of 3,000 FACA soldiers:

- Qualifying courses for 344 FACA officers (i.e. 38% of the total officers) and 544 non-commissioned officers (i.e. 26% non-commissioned officers);
- Training for 1,600 FACA soldiers (a total of three battalions, the last battalion finishes training in early August 2018);
- Training of 232 FACA soldiers as part of the pilot project for disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation;
- The validation of the training of 344 FACA soldiers organized in Rwanda and Equatorial Guinea.

2. Additional information on the training of FACA by instructors from the Russian Federation

The first training of personnel of the CAR national defence and security forces by the military (5) and civilian (170) instructors of the Russian Federation, as notified to the Committee on 26 December 2017, was concluded on 31 March 2018. The training took place in the CAR and in the Sudan. During an official ceremony at the training site on 31 March 2018 in Berengo, 65 km southwest of Bangui, 202 FACA soldiers and Presidential Guards demonstrated some of the operational skills acquired during their training.¹ Few days earlier, on 26 March, most of the National defence and security forces trained in the Sudan² flew back to the Central African Republic.³

The second training of 200 FACA soldiers and 54 Presidential Guards was conducted in Berengo between 30 March and 30 May 2018. The third training of 400 FACA soldiers and 62 Presidential Guards started in Berengo on 30 May 2018. This brings the total of FACA soldiers and Presidential Guards trained by Russian instructors to approximately 900.⁴

The presence of instructors from the Russian Federation amidst the Presidential Guard, as observed by the Panel in Berengo on 31 March, was reported to be part of the training

¹ Panel's visit to Berengo, 31 March 2018.

² 85 FACA from BIT3 battalion; 1 FACA from BIT4 battalion; 2 FACA from BIT5 battalion; 112 elements from the Presidential Guard.

³ Meeting with the Minister of Defence of the CAR, Bangui, 27 April 2018. Meeting with the then Head of the Russian training and weapons management mission, Bangui, 6 April 2018.

⁴ Meeting with Presidential security adviser, Bangui, 19 June 2018.

exercise.⁵ Contrary to the information conveyed by several media sources,⁶ the then Head of the training mission of the Russian Federation told the Panel that there was no plan to include Russian nationals in the Presidential Guard or the close protection of the President.⁷

⁵ Meeting with Presidential security adviser, Bangui, 6 April 2018.

⁶ See, for instance, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/551743/politique/centrafrique-la-garde-rapprochee-russe-du-president-touadera/>; <http://107.189.40.50/ptv//program/20180417/afriquepress0128.mp4>, accessed on 20 April 2018.

⁷ Meeting with Presidential security adviser, Bangui, 6 April 2018. Meeting with the Director-General of the Gendarmerie, Bangui, 24 May 2018.

Annex 2.2: The delivery and use of exempted weapons and ammunition.

1. Chinko Project's arms and ammunition

On 17 January 2018, firearms (total 135) and ammunition (total 91,240 rounds) for use by Chinko Project/African Parks Network - as exempted by the Sanctions Committee on 27 February 2017 - arrived at Bangui M'Poko International Airport from Borges, Bulgaria. Upon arrival, the aircraft was unloaded by Chinko personnel and the CAR armed and security forces, and brought to a secure UNMAS storage facility under MINUSCA escort.⁸ MINUSCA (UNMAS), in collaboration with inspectors of the Ministries of Water and Forestry, Defence and Interior, immediately proceeded with the detailed verification of the shipment, as planned in advance by all partners concerned. The next day, the weapons and ammunition were safely transported by air to Chinko Project, Haute Kotto and Mbomou préfectures. The weapons are currently being used by the 52 rangers of the Chinko Project.

Some minor differences between the amounts of ammunition ordered and those received were observed by UNMAS and Chinko. Moreover, the serial numbers on the weapons did not correspond to the serial numbers on the list received by Chinko from the supplier. The Panel urged Chinko to request the CAR authorities to send a letter to the Sanctions Committee to report this information, which they did on 19 April 2018.

The Panel notes that some members of the diplomatic community and MINUSCA staff have raised concerns regarding the use of conventional weapons of war by Chinko rangers in a park surrounded by areas with strong armed group presence, and have questioned the rangers' legitimacy to exercise law enforcement duties.⁹

The Chinko Project was founded as a Central African Republic non-governmental organization in 2013. It is managed by the African Parks Network that has obtained a license from the CAR Government until the year 2064 to sustainably manage a 17,600-sq. km area in eastern CAR, the Chinko Project Area (CPA). The CPA rangers have full authority to enforce Central African law inside the CPA by arresting and disarming poachers and transporting them to the responsible Central African authorities, according to the mandate issued by the CAR Government.

⁸ The Panel was present at the Bangui airport to observe the delivery on 17 January 2018.

⁹ Meeting of the Arms Embargo Working Group, Bangui, 29 January 2018. Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 17 January 2018.

2. Arms and ammunition from the Russian Federation


The first phase of the delivery of weapons and ammunition from the Russian Federation was completed on 7 February 2018. A first aircraft arrived at Bangui M'Poko International Airport on Friday 26 January; two other aircraft arrived during the night from Tuesday 30 to Wednesday 31 January; two aircraft arrived in the night from Thursday 1 February to Friday 2 February; two aircraft arrived in the late afternoon and evening of 5 February 2018; and two aircraft arrived on 7 February 2018.

The aircraft were unloaded by nationals of the Russian Federation in the military area of the airport, in the presence of the CAR security and armed forces providing perimeter security and, at times, in the presence of EUTM and/or UNMAS staff as well as the Panel of Experts.¹⁰ The Government of the CAR requested and received the support of MINUSCA to escort the weapons from the M'Poko Airport to Camp de Roux. Given that all the flights reached Bangui after sundown, it was not possible to proceed with a proper inspection of the stockpile upon arrival. CAR and Russian officials indicated that, upon completion of the transfer of the exempted materiel, UNMAS and the Panel would have access to the entire stockpile for inspection and accounting.¹¹ As indicated in paragraph 20 of the report, on 18 June 2018 the Minister of Defence sent a letter to MINUSCA requesting an expeditiously inspection (see below).

¹⁰ The Panel of Experts was present at the Bangui M'Poko International Airport when the first aircraft arrived on 29 January 2018.

¹¹ Communication with UNMAS, 3 February 2018 and phone conversation with a representative of the Embassy of the Russian Federation, Bangui, 29 January 2018.

Letter dated 18 June 2018 from the Minister of Defence of the CAR regarding the inspection. Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 19 June 2018.





Below photographs of a Russian 7,62 mm Kalashnikov PK machine-gun with serial number CT400 taken by the Panel in Sibut on 25 May 2018.



The distribution method of the weapons and ammunition from the Russian Federation is such that each individual recipient will be responsible and accountable for the received weaponry: a form with detailed information (identity picture, number and type of equipment received, serial number of each weapon) is prepared for each individual receiving equipment and signed by the beneficiary.¹²

¹² Meeting with Presidential security adviser, Bangui, 6 April 2018. Meeting with EUTM, Bangui, 6 April 2018. Correspondence with confidential source 12 April 2018.

Copies of the individual fiches. Document obtained by the Panel from the Presidential security adviser 4 June 2018.



3. The distribution and use of arms and ammunition repatriated from Cameroon

Part of the military equipment repatriated from Cameroon (S/2017/1023, para. 25 and annex 2.4), as approved by the Sanctions Committee on 4 May 2017, was transported to Paoua in view of its use during the “Mbaranga operation”.

On 25 January 2018, 58 FACA soldiers were deployed to Paoua (Ouham Pendé prefecture) to work alongside MINUSCA as part of the “Mbaranga operation”, which aimed at ensuring the withdrawal of all armed groups to 50 kilometers from the town.¹³ A FACA officer informed the Panel that the FACA soldiers were under MINUSCA Force command.¹⁴

Copy of the register in Camp De Roux listing the military equipment repatriated from Cameroon and transported to Paoua in view of their use during the “Mbaranga operation”. Documents obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 26 January 2018

¹³ Confidential reports 17 and 29 January 2018. Meeting with officials from the CAR Government and confidential sources, Bangui, 29 January 2018.

¹⁴ Meeting with Captain Gambi, Paoua, 30 January 2018.

4. Proposal for a protocol governing exempted arms, ammunition and military equipment

The latest transfer of military equipment from Cameroon, Bulgaria (Chinko project) and the Russian Federation demonstrates the need for MINUSCA, in cooperation with the CAR authorities, to develop a protocol governing the inspection and stockpile management of exempted military equipment.

The purpose of such an inspection protocol would be to clearly establish the responsibilities and tasks of the (i) CAR security and armed forces, (ii) exporting State or private enterprise, and (iii) MINUSCA. The protocol would also set a standard procedure regarding (a) timely information sharing on the exact time of the arrival of the military equipment and the details of each shipment; (b) security measures to be adopted; (c) transport and verification of the imports; (d) safe storage of the imports; and (e) subsequent inspections and registration of the imports.

To date, imports of exempted military equipment are processed on an *ad hoc* basis, which has, at times, resulted in questions by some individuals or entities of the legitimacy of some actions (such as the presence of, and inspection by, MINUSCA staff) and the measures that need to be taken for the purpose of mitigating the possible diversion of imported armaments (such as ensuring the security, inspection and safe storage of weapons and ammunition). The involvement of the newly-established National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons would also be essential for ensuring a smooth management of imported armaments.

Annex 2.4: Additional information on travel ban violations by François Bozizé and Nourredine Adam.

1. Travel ban violations by François Bozizé : additional information

1.1. Information provided to the Panel by Member States

Between 26 February and 1 March 2018, the Panel transmitted official communications underlining the need to enforce the travel ban against “Samuel Peter Mudde” and requested additional information on possible travel by Mr. Bozizé using Mr. Mudde’s identity. Letters were sent to the Governments of countries reportedly visited by Mr. Bozizé since his listing by the 2127 Committee on 9 May 2014, namely Benin, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, as well as to airlines that the former President may have used to travel, namely Askya, Ethiopian Airlines, Rwandair and Kenya Airways.

On 17 April 2018, the Cameroonian authorities informed the Panel that Mr. Bozizé had not visited Cameroon since 2013, when the former President was briefly granted asylum in this country. They also confirmed that the name François Bozizé was included in the list of individuals whose entry on the Cameroonian territory was banned.

In its December 2017 final report, the Panel indicated that in October 2017, Mr. Bozizé had reportedly travelled to Benin (S/2017/1023, para.33), where he would have participated in religious ceremonies. In response to an information request by the Panel, on 15 May 2018 the Government of Benin informed the Panel that its Immigration and Emigration Services had found no record of Mr. Bozizé’s entry into or exit from Benin’s territory.

Ethiopian Airlines provided on 23 March 2018 the full itinerary of Mr. Bozizé’s travel of May 2017 (using Mr. Mudde’s identity) as cited in the Panel’s 2017 midterm report (S/2017/639, para. 35). Mr. Bozizé travelled from Entebbe (Uganda) to Lagos (Nigeria) on 6 May 2017 and returned to Entebbe from Lagos on 10 May 2017. He connected through Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) for both flights. The ticket was purchased in cash at the Ethiopian Airlines office in Kampala. On 23 June 2018, Ethiopian Airlines also confirmed having included Mr. Mudde on its no-fly list.

Mr. Bozizé’s presence was also observed in late March 2018, in Abuja, Federal Republic of Nigeria, where Mr. Bozizé reportedly also took part in religious ceremonies.¹⁵ The Panel sent letters to the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 30 November 2017, 26 February and 16 April 2018 to request information on this trip, as well as on the presence of Mr. Bozizé (using Mr. Mudde’s identity) on Nigerian territory between 6 and 10 May 2017. On 19 April 2018, the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria confirmed that “Mr. Mudde” had travelled to Nigeria on 6 May 2017 through Murtala Muhammad airport; his departure, however, was not registered by the authorities. The Government of

¹⁵ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 28 March 2018. Meeting with a diplomatic source, Bangui, 31 March 2018.

the Federal Republic of Nigeria also confirmed having included "Mr. Mudde" on its watch list.

The Panel recalls that pursuant to paragraph 14 (a) of resolution 2399 (2018), and upon approval by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, listed individuals can travel in certain circumstances, including in the context of "religious obligations", albeit by requesting a travel exemption through their state of residence.

The Government of South Africa, as well as the companies Asky, Rwandair and Kenya Airways, have yet to provide a response to the Panel.

1.2. Possible use of other passports by François Bozizé

The Panel is of the view that Mr. Bozizé is most likely using several identification documents featuring different names. For instance, while the Kenyan authorities informed the Panel that the South Sudanese passport featuring Mr. Mudde's name was used at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (Nairobi) only once, i.e. on 22 July 2013, the Panel had been earlier informed that Mr. Bozizé had also reportedly travelled to Nairobi in November 2016 (S/2017/639, para.34). Furthermore, the above-mentioned passport of "Mr. Mudde" expired on 11 June 2017.


1.3. The decision of the CAR national authorities to forbid airline companies to board François Bozizé on their flights

On 17 November 2016, the national authorities of the Central African Republic issued a circular instructing airline companies flying to the CAR territory not to accept listed individual François Bozizé aboard their planes.

The circular refers to Security Council resolutions 2196 (2015) and 2127 (2013). In this connection, the Panel recalls that paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2399 (2018) pertaining to the travel ban indicates that "nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory". Similar language was included in prior resolutions on the sanctions regime, including resolutions 2196 (2015) and 2127 (2013) mentioned in the circular.

Security Council resolutions therefore do not prevent listed individual François Bozizé from returning to the Central African Republic. It rather bans travels to other countries. However, if Mr. Bozizé endeavours to return to CAR via a third country, a travel exemption request would have to be submitted by the State of residence (Uganda) on his behalf.

Document obtained by the Panel from the CAR Ministry of Transports on 20 June 2018.



3. Travel ban violation by Nourredine Adam

Listed individual Nourredine Adam reportedly travelled to Khartoum, the Sudan, in late January 2018. The travel was facilitated by unidentified individuals who picked him up in Nyala, the Sudan, and transported him to Khartoum by plane.¹⁶ Mr. Adam also reportedly travelled to Am Dafok, the Sudan, in late January 2018.

In this connection, the Panel reiterates that pursuant to paragraph 14 (c) of resolution 2399 (2018), and upon approval by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, listed individuals can travel in certain circumstances, including to take part in meetings furthering the objectives of peace and national reconciliation.

¹⁶ Meeting with diplomatic sources, Bangui, 21, 22 and 31 March 2018.

Annex 3.1: Visits undertaken by the African Union Panel of Facilitators.

First series of visits (November-December 2017)

- 27 November 2017, MPC in Kaga Bandoro;
- 29 November 2017, Séléka Renovée, Bangui;
- 29 November 2017, anti-balaka Ngaissona branch, Bangui;
- 30 November 2017, UFR-UFRF, Bangui;
- 30 November 2017, anti-balaka Mokom branch, Bangui;
- 2 December 2017, UPC, Alindao;
- 5 December 2017, MLCJ in Birao;
- 6 December 2017, FPRC in Birao;
- 7 December 2017, CNDS coalition in Bria in lieu of RPRC;
- 9 December 2017, RJ Belanga in Paoua;
- 9 December 2017, RJ Sayo in Paoua;
- 9 December 2017, 3R in Kouï;
- 11 December 2017, FDPC in Bouar.

Second series of visits (February-April 2018)

- 19 February 2018, MPC in Kaga Bandoro;
- 20 February 2018, Séléka Renovée in Bangui;
- 21 February 2018, FDPC in Bouar;
- 22 February 2018, 3R in Kouï;
- 24 February 2018, anti-balaka Ngaissona branch in Bangui;
- 26 February 2018, RPRC in Bria;
- 28 February 2018, MLCJ in Birao;
- 5 March 2018, UPC in Alindao;
- 6 March 2018, anti-balaka Mokom branch in Bangui;
- 10 March 2018, UFR and UFR-F in Bangui;
- 27 March 2018, FPRC in Ndele;
- 1 April 2018, RJ Sayo and RJ Belanga in Paoua.

Field-visits undertaken by the AU Panel of Facilitators in the aftermath of the “Operation Sukula” and the Fatima incident in order to ease the tensions resulting from these events

- 16 May and 04 June 2018: Meeting with MPC leadership in Kaga Bandoro.
- 23-24 May 2018: Meeting with FPRC leadership in Birao.
- 24 May 2018: Meeting with RPRC leadership in Bria.

Meetings with former Presidents

- 15 May 2018: Meeting with Michel Djotodia.

Annex 3.2: Analysis of the recent events in Bangassou (Mbomou prefecture)

After a turbulent year (S/2017/1023, paras. 74-91), the security situation in Bangassou has improved. Three recent events have created a window of opportunity in town: the signature of a local peace agreement (see below); the arrest of the self-defence leader Crépin Wakanam, alias “Pino Pino”; and the launch of a Community Violence Reduction (CVR) programme.

On 9 April 2018, after two days of negotiation under the good offices of the cardinal Nzapalainga and the imam Kobine, self-defence groups, local authorities, civil society and MINUSCA signed an agreement including various mutual engagements to guarantee the end of hostilities and freedom of movement in the town.¹⁷ The agreement was seriously compromised by some inter-communal incidents in May,¹⁸ after which MINUSCA organized a 2-day inclusive dialogue and created a follow-up committee on 4-5 June.¹⁹

The return of relative stability in town has also been facilitated by the progressive disappearance of the most dangerous self-defence group leaders: “Ngadé” was killed in inter-group clashes in December 2017; “Bere-Bere” surrendered to MINUSCA in January 2018; and “Pino Pino” fled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where he was arrested together with 37 members of his group, on 16 May 2018.²⁰ However, the main instigators of the attack on Tokoyo neighborhood in April 2017, such as Yvon Nzéléte or Deputy Mayor Michel Baguinati (S/2017/1023, paras. 88-99), still occupy their positions as local leaders and continue to build on the economic gains they obtained from the shutdown of Muslim businesses in town.

“Pino Pino” was responsible for most of the violent robberies and lootings that forced international NGOs to suspend their activities at the end of 2017.²¹ On 14 May 2018, prior to leaving the country, he engaged in fighting with local self-defence groups around Béma and burned down more than 550 houses in the area.²² On 27 June, “Pino Pino” and 33 members of his group were extradited from the DRC, at the request of the CAR Government. “Pino Pino” was transferred to Camp de Roux prison, while the others to Ngaragba and Bimbo prisons.²³

The last factor contributing to the current stability in Bangassou town is the CVR program launched in May by MINUSCA for 700 beneficiaries. People included in the program receive a paid training for three months to learn a profession in exchange of handing over their weapons. To date, MINUSCA has collected almost 1,500 weapons and is considering launching a second CVR phase in August 2018.

¹⁷ Meeting with local authorities, Bangassou, 12 June 2018.

¹⁸ In particular, on 10 May, self-defence elements shot and killed an IDP near the site at the cathedral. In retaliation, IDPs stabbed a young man and threw him into a well, confidential report, 11 May 2018.

¹⁹ Meeting with confidential source, Bangassou, 12 June 2018.

²⁰ Confidential report, 16 May 2018.

²¹ Meeting with NGO representative, Bangassou, 12 June 2018.

²² Meeting with local authorities, Bangassou, 12 June 2018.

²³ Confidential report, 28 June 2018.

However, the positive effect of this injection of money to Bangassou may be offset by the fact that only very few automatic weapons have been collected.²⁴

The improvement in the security situation has not yet had an impact on the living conditions of the Bangassou Muslim community, whose members have been confined to the "Petit Séminaire" site since May 2017.²⁵ The number of IDPs decreased from around 2,700 to 1,546 in June 2018, mainly because of spontaneous departures to Bangui or to the regional countries (DRC, but also Cameroon and Mali).²⁶ Even though a certain freedom of movement in Bangassou town was guaranteed, following the 9 April agreement, and IDPs could access the city's market, during the Panel's visit on 12-14 June 2018 the site was again isolated from the rest of the town, mainly because of the impact of the incidents which occurred in May 2018.

Also, the presence of weapons in the IDP site is creating growing tensions with both local authorities and church representatives, who accuse some of the displaced persons being behind certain criminal acts.²⁷ Calls for the commencement of The demand to carry out a disarmament operation in the IPD site and accelerate the return of the Muslim community to the Tokoyo neighbourhood is rising among Bangassou's local population.²⁸ On the other hand, the IDPs accuse the members of the local church of supporting the self-defence groups and of spreading discriminatory discourse against the Muslim community (S/20171023, paras. 92-97). The arrival of the FACA contingent in town on 22 June 2018 may have an impact on the situation of the IDPs in the coming months, which will be monitored by the Panel.

Even though some international NGOs are slowly returning to Bangassou, assessing the security situation and planning the reopening of their programmes, aid agencies in town continue to maintain a low profile. Because of their isolation, IDPs are completely dependent on the limited humanitarian assistance for food and water. The SDGs prevent Muslims to access to health care: if external consultations are carried out inside the IDP site by an international NGO, emergencies and serious cases have almost no access to the local hospital. Also, IDP have limited access to education as the secondary school close to the site was closed at the end of 2017 because of inter-community tensions. However, Bangassou remains privileged compared to the rest of the Mbomou prefecture, which remains cut off from humanitarian assistance as both MINUSCA and NGO access are obstructed due to the presence of self-defence groups.²⁹

²⁴ Meeting with a confidential source, Bangassou, 14 June 2018.

²⁵ Meeting with IDPs representative, Bangassou, 13 June 2018.

²⁶ Meeting with IOM representative, Bangassou, 13 June 2018.

²⁷ Meeting with a confidential source, Bangassou, 13 June 2018.

²⁸ Meeting with a confidential source, Bangassou, 13 June 2018.

²⁹ Meeting with NGO representative, Bangassou, 12 June 2018.

Text of the agreement signed in Bangassou on 9 April 2018, obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 13 June 2018.

République centrafricaine

Bangassou, 09 Avril 2018

Unité Dignité travail

RECOMMANDATIONS

Nous, participants à la réunion de concertation des entités de la ville de Bangassou tenue du 07 au 08 Avril 2018 dans la salle de réunion de la municipalité de Bangassou recommandons :

1. AU GOUVERNEMENT :

- Le désarmement tous les groupes armés (auto-défenses et ceux du site des déplacés du petit séminaire Saint Louia).
- Restauration de l'autorité de l'état.
- Réouverture du corridor Bambari- Bangassou
- Redéploiement de forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) à Bangassou
- Renforcement en effectif des forces de sécurité intérieur (FSI)
- Renforcement du système Educatif et sanitaire.
- Octroi des crédits aux opérateurs économiques de Bangassou pour leurs relances.
- Redéploiement et renforcement de l'appareil judiciaire
- Démantèlement des barrières illégales dans le Mbomou et sur l'axe Bambari-Bangassou

2. A LA MINUSCA :

- La neutralité dans ces activités
- Création des emplois pour les jeunes
- Formation des jeunes et des femmes à la culture de la paix
- Sécurisation de Mbomou
- Sensibilisation de la population sur le rôle de la Minusca
- L'instauration des Check-points ensemble avec la force locale
- Mise en place du processus de réduction de violence communautaire (CVR)

3. AUX GROUPES ARMES :

- La libre circulation des humanitaires
- Cessation immédiate des hostilités
- Ouverture du couloir Humanitaire (marché du site petit séminaire)
- Libre circulation des biens et des personnes
- Accepter le processus de réduction de violence communautaire (CVR)
- Démantèlement des barrières illégales dans Bangassou et les périphéries

4. POUR LA PLATEFORME DES CONFESSIONS RELIGIEUSES DE CENTRAFRIQUE (PCRC) :

- Accompagnement psychosocial des victimes de la crise à Bangassou
- Formation des jeunes et adultes sur la gestion et prévention des conflits

5. AUX HUMANITAIRES :

- Appuyer les initiatives communautaires
- Recrutement local du personnel
- Sensibilisation de la population sur l'importance des Humanitaires

Au regard de toutes ces recommandations, nous nous engageons à les respecter et à dire : **PLUS JAMAIS CA.**

Fait à Bangassou le 09 Avril 2018


Ont signé :

- 1- Pour la jeunesse : ~~Fred~~ NISSEI - FREN
- 2- Pour les auto-défenses : ~~W~~ ZINET - ROGER ~~de~~
- 3- Pour l'organisation des femmes centrafricaines (OPCA) : ~~Y~~ ~~Libe~~
- 4- Pour les chefs de quartiers et des villages : ~~AS~~ ABRAH NIAOUN
- 5- Pour les déplacés du site Saint Louis de Bangassou : B. MAHAMATI A.
- 6- Pour la Plateforme des Confessions Religieuses de Centrafrique (Bangassou) (PCRC) : ~~Ab. Martin~~ Ab. Martin MODORE
- 7- Pour les opérateurs Economiques de Bangassou : ~~DI~~ DINI PAHIL
- 8- Pour les Fonctionnaires : ~~J~~ Jean Jacques DOUGOUA
- 9- Pour les députés : ~~ND~~ NDAQUIAMA - Paul
- 10- Pour les humanitaires : ~~G~~ GZETI CRIPI
- 11- Le Maire de la ville : ~~Théophile~~ Théophile
- 12- Le Préfet de Mbomou : ~~Richard~~ Richard NOUIDEMONA
- 13- Le chef de Bureau MINUSCA
 Rosuel Pierre Louis, Chef de Bureau
 Pr le MINUSCA ~~Rosuel~~, Observa
 teur du Processus de Dialogue -
~~Rosuel~~

Annex 3.3: FPRC meeting with the AU Panel of Facilitators, Ndélé, 27 March 2018.

Excerpts from FPRC communiqué dated 27 March 2018 and shared with the AU Panel of Facilitators. Document provided to the Panel of Experts by a confidential source on 30 March 2018.

« ... la seule manière de faire la paix est une bonne Union. Ainsi, dans l'histoire
 de l'Afrique, c'est la paix qui a permis aux hommes de vivre en paix à l'échelle
 continentale, à l'échelle des collectivités et même au sein de la famille.
 Nous tenons à exprimer notre inébranlable soutien à l'Union africaine.
 Car le dialogue démocratique mène la résolution du problème. En abordant
 un problème conséquent qui appelle à l'effacement des racines de la guerre, l'initiative
 de l'Union Africaine est nécessaire d'espérer.
 Avant de passer à nos préoccupations nous avons constaté après la remise
 officielle de la feuille de route de l'Union Africaine par le groupe des facilitateurs et
 l'analyse approfondie de celle-ci que le FPRC ne se retrouve pas du fait que :
 - Il n'est pas signataire du processus DDR
 - Il n'est ni un simple observateur au CCS-DDR
 Par conséquent le FPRC soumet des préalables avant la signature d'un nouvel
 accord politique sous l'égide de l'Union Africaine qu'il souhaite dans un pays neutre.
Les préalables sont les suivants :
 1- Le régime doit cesser de soutenir et entretenir les combattants
 2- Les combattants doivent cesser immédiatement d'attaquer la population civile les
 humanitaires et la MINUSCA ;
 3- Un engagement du gouvernement à libérer immédiatement et assurer le retour
 de la liberté mouvementée acquiescée dans les églises (Bangassou et autres) ;
 4- Les propos haineux, discriminatoires tendant à l'incitation et la violence doivent
 cesser d'être diffusés sur les ondes (Ndélé Luka et autres) ;
 5- Le déploiement des forces de défense et de sécurité dans les zones sous contrôle
 du FPRC ne doit pas se faire avant la signature de l'accord politique en respectant
 l'article 13 paragraphes 4 de la résolution 2087 ;
 6- Un engagement de non-agression de la part du gouvernement et de ses alliés
 contre les positions du FPRC ;
 7- La levée immédiate des sanctions et la garantie de non poursuite aux leaders du
 FPRC devenus acteurs de la paix ;
 8- Un engagement du gouvernement pour le retour et l'installation des déplacés et
 des réfugiés dans leurs foyers d'origine ;
 9- Le déploiement d'une assistance humanitaire d'urgence dans les régions du nord
 de la République centrafricaine ;



- L'organisation d'un programme de coopération pour la reconstruction des infrastructures et l'amélioration du bien-être.
- La création d'un corps spécial d'enseignement et de développement de l'agriculture.
- La création d'un université régionale et des centres de formation professionnelle dans le nord-est.
- La prise en charge ou dédommagement des combattants plus âgés, des orphelins, veuves et victimes des violences post conflit.
- La construction des minorités en partie civile devant les juridictions compétentes afin de réclamer leurs droits et leurs biens saisis par l'ennemi.
- La création dans le nord-est des entreprises ou sociétés de sécurité et de surveillance dans le cadre de la protection de l'environnement, des Parcs nationaux, des réserves des faunes et des aires protégées, et la gestion des forêts, les ressources naturelles et énergétiques du sous-sol pour un emploi de main d'œuvre afin d'absorber une partie des ex-combattants n'ayant pas bénéficié de l'insertion dans les forces de défense et de sécurité.

Fait à Ndola, le 27 Mars 2018.

La Vice-Président

[Signature]

Généralnoureidine ADAM




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Pictures of FPRC leaders and listed individuals Abdoulaye Hissène, Nourredine Adam and Haroun Gaye during the meeting with the AU Panel of Facilitators in Ndélé on 27 March 2018. Available at <https://www.facebook.com/1675329812539507/photos/a.1678404342232054.1073741828.1675329812539507/1901204249952061/?type=3&theater>, posted on 28 March 2018.



Annex 4: National Commission of Inquiry established by the CAR Government on the failed coup d'état in Equatorial Guinea.



ARRETS

ART. 1^{er} : Il est créé une commission d'Investigation Judiciaire Nationale chargée de faire la lumière sur l'acte de Terrorisme du Coup d'Etat manqué issu de Terrorisme en Tchad-Equatoriale.

ART. 2 : La Commission d'Investigation Judiciaire Nationale est placée sous l'autorité directe du Ministre de la Justice des Droits de l'Homme, Garde des Sceaux, et sous la surveillance et la coordination du Parquet Général près la Cour d'Appel de Bangui.

ART. 3 : Compte tenu de la pluralité des ressortissants de différentes nationalités impliqués, la Commission d'Investigation Judiciaire Nationale a pour mission de :

- Procéder à la recherche et à l'arrestation des présumés commanditaires, auteurs, coauteurs et complices des ressortissants des différentes Nationalités sur le territoire Centrafricain.
- Auditionner les témoins.
- Interroger les présumés commanditaires, criminels arrêtés, et leurs confrontations avec les témoins, tout en respectant les règles édictées par le code de procédure pénale Centrafricaine.
- Et dresser les procès-verbaux d'enquête.

Dans le cadre de cette enquête, la commission mènera les investigations en collaboration avec les commissions d'enquêtes des autres Etats dont les ressortissants sont impliqués.

Le Cadre Juridique de la Collaboration Judiciaire demeure :

- a) La convention de TANANARIVE sur la coopération en matière de Justice du 12 Septembre 1961.
- b) L'accord de coopération en matière de Justice France-RCFA.
- c) L'accord de coopération judiciaire entre les Etats membres de la CEMAC du 24 Janvier 2004.
- d) L'accord d'extradition entre les Etats membres de la CEMAC du 24 Janvier 2004.

ART. 4 : La Commission est composée de :

- 1- Un (1) Coordonneur
- 2- Un (1) Coordonneur adjoint
- 3- Trois (3) Magistrats (Juge d'instruction, et deux Magistrats du Ministère Public)
- 4- Un (1) expert du Ministère de la Défense Nationale et de la reconstruction de l'armée
- 5- Un (1) Expert de la Gendarmerie Nationale
- 6- Un (1) Expert de la Police Centrafricaine
- 7- Six (6) Officiers de Police Judiciaire
- 8- Un (1) Greffier
- 9- Une (1) Opérateur de Santé

ART. 5 : Le mandat de la Commission prendra fin après le dépôt de son rapport à la Commission Régionale d'Enquête de la CFMAC

ART. 6 : Le fonctionnement et les charges liés aux investigations sont imputés au Budget de l'Etat

ART. 7 : Le présent Décret qui prend effet à compter de sa date de signature sera enregistré et publié par son auteur

Fait à Bangui, le 23 JAN 2018

Le Ministre de la Justice, des Droits de l'Homme, Garde des Sceaux.



[Signature]
Eloyle MBATA

Annex 5.1: Chronology of events in the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui from January to April 2018.

Information below was obtained by the Panel from confidential sources.

On 17 January, a dispute between self-defence groups (SDGs) following a football game triggered violent clashes and the torching of dozens of boutiques in the PK5 market.

On 18 January, a group of PK5 merchants stopped paying taxes to the self-defence groups. "Force" gave a one-week ultimatum to the merchants to resume the collection of taxes, heightening tensions between some communities and SDGs.

On 18 January, MINUSCA met a group of PK5 merchants. This was the first of a series of meetings between MINUSCA and PK5 civil society, during which the "Collectif des Victimes de l'Incident du 17 Janvier" officially requested the intervention of MINUSCA and the Government to arrest "Force". During the month of February, a number of incidents involving SDGs was registered.

On 22 February, clashes erupted between the SDGs under "Force" and "You" over a dispute for the control of the PK5 market.

On 28 February, the rival SDG factions of "Force" and "You" concluded a peace agreement to end hostilities.

On 12 March, representatives from the various ethnic groups of the PK5 area and individuals viewed as influent members of SDGs created the PK5 Crisis Prevention Committee (CPC). This committee started a series of meetings with MINUSCA to find a solution to counter the SDGs' predatory activities.

On 5 April, the CPC advised MINUSCA not to launch a military operation against the SDGs due to the possible impact of such an initiative on the civilian population.

On 8 April, at 2:00 a.m., MINUSCA, FACA and ISF launched a joint disarmament and arrest operation (the "Operation Sukula"), targeting the bases of criminal groups in the PK5 neighbourhood. As for contingency measures for protection of civilians, it was planned to: ask the population to remain in lock-down in case of cross-fire; evacuate the populations close to the SDG's bases towards places previously identified; and support humanitarian actors to bring assistance to displaced populations. The operation resulted in the arrest of low-profile criminals and the seizure of arms, ammunition and drugs, while the self-defence chiefs and principal targets of the operation, including Nimery Matar Jamous alias "Force", managed to escape. During the raid, two SDG fighters died and 45 persons (including civilians) were wounded, while 12 peacekeepers sustained injuries. The police station of the 3rd district was also burned, reportedly by SDG members after the departure of MINUSCA and national security forces from the area.

Later in the night, at 11:15 p.m., unidentified armed elements opened the fire against the base of the Egyptian and Jordanian police contingents located at Camp Fidel, in the capital's 1st district. One peacekeeper suffered a minor injury.

On 9 April, the CPC published a communiqué condemning "Operation Sukula" and asking for its suspension due to the possible impact on the civilian population.

On 10 April, around 1 p.m., the abduction of a Fulani woman and her child on the outskirts of the PK5 neighbourhood reportedly provoked the angry reaction of the local population. About a hundred people marched towards the police station of the 5th district, controlled by FACA since the beginning of the operation. A patrol of Rwandan peacekeepers, that had intervened to interpose, engaged in a firefight with armed men in the crowd. The deadly clash lasted more than two hours resulting in 30 people reportedly killed and 100 injured, while one Rwandan peacekeeper was killed and 8 were injured. On the same afternoon, during a search operation conducted by national authorities and MINUSCA to prevent an alleged uprising in the Ngaragba prison, several inmates opposed MINUSCA's and national authorities' actions and tried to escape. During these events two inmates were killed.

On 11 April, in the morning, a crowd of about 1,000 people marched from the capital's 3rd district towards MINUSCA headquarters and, in a sign of protest, deposited the bodies of 16 people killed during the previous day's clashes in front of the Mission's gate. They claimed that the victims were civilians killed during the operation conducted by MINUSCA and Central African security forces. Several anti-MINUSCA slogans and placards were displayed during the demonstration, while MINUSCA considered the use of dead bodies as propaganda against the Mission.³⁰

³⁰ See <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43735333>, consulted on 15 April 2018.

Documents obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 29 June 2018.

**PROCES VERBAL DE LA REUNION DU COMITE DE
PREVENTION DE CRISE
DANS LE TROISIEME ARRONDISSEMENT DE BANGUI**
Solidarité-Paix-Liberté

Le 2018 le lundi 12 Mars à quinze heures trente minutes s'est tenu dans le troisième Arrondissement de Bangui une réunion initiée et ouverte par Monsieur OUSMANE Maharrat Ousmane Conseiller spécial à la Présidence de la République.

Un seul point était à l'ordre du jour : Le renouvellement du Bureau de prévention de crise dans le troisième Arrondissement de Bangui.

Après une discussion constructive il était convenu du renouvellement du bureau suivant afin de le rendre plus dynamique et très proches des auto-défenses et de permettre la prévention et la réduction des problèmes dans le troisième Arrondissement de Bangui.

Ainsi un bureau a été mis en place, ce bureau est composé comme suit :

BUREAU EXECUTIF :

Président : ATAJIR BACA DODO

1^{er} Vice-Président : Colonel NJADER LAZARE

2^{ème} Vice-Président : DIKOLN AMALAS-AMLAS

Secrétaire Général : KOLOSTRE ABDOULAYE DJONGO

Secrétaire Général Adjoint : MAHMOUD RIYAD

Chargé des Affaires Civiles et Politiques : MALIK KARGMCHI

Chargé de Communication : DJAMIE BABA NANI

Chargé de Sécurité et Mobilisation : ISMAELA LAWANE

LES CONSEILLERS

1. ABDOULAYE SAÏJO
2. Pasteur KUSSINGOU Albert
3. ALI OUSMANE
4. ABDOULAYE CHAIRBOU
5. EL-HADI MAHROUK HASSANE
6. HASSANE AMADOU
7. EL-HADI AMADOU BOUBA YAKA
8. ZAKARIYA DJAL ABY
9. BATAKAR HAROUNE

SOUS COMITE DE SAGE DU 3^{em} ARRONDISSEMENT

Président: IMAM AHMA MOUSSA

Vice-Président: IMAM AWADALKAUM

Secrétaire Général: ISSA OUMAROU

MEMBRES

IMAM: ABAKAR HAKOUNE

IMAM: MAHAKAT TAHER

IMAM: MAMADOU CAMARA

IMAM: ZAKARIYA

IMAM: ABDELKARIM INYAS

IMAM: OUSMANE HASSANE

IMAM: MAHAMAT ADAM

IMAM: MAHAMAT ISSA

IMAM: ABDALAH MATAR

Sous Comité Des Notables Du Troisième Arrondissement

Président: EL-HADI ISRAÏM BOUBA YAKA

Vice-Président: DALA ABANA

Secrétaire Général: KOUAGRA MAHAMAT MOCTAR

MEMBRES

➤ ADAMOU DANDJUMA

➤ MARCELINE KOLONGO

**SOUS COMITE DE DISCIPLINE ET DE SUIVI DES ACCORDS DE PAIX AU
KILOMETRES CINQ DANS LE 3^{em} ARRONDISSEMENT DE BANGUI**

Président: ISSA BOURMA

Vice-Président: DJIDA AH ABAKAR

Secrétaire Général: IBRAHIM ZERAZOU

Les Conseillers

➤ OUSMANE SOULEYMANE ABONDOSHI

➤ SALET DAQUAM

➤ MAHAMAT FADOUL YAKHOUB

NOUVEAU COMITE DE LA JEUNESSE DU 3^{ème} ARRODISSEMENT**Président:** MOUSSA HASSABARAYSSOUL**1^{er} Vice-Président:** AROUFAY ABDEL-AZIZ**Secrétaire Générale:** MOUSTAFA YOUNOUB**Secrétaire Générale Adjoint:** ANDER RYAD**Les Conseillers :**

- BAHAT MOUSSA
- MAOULOUD ASSAÏ

Sous Comité Des Opérateurs Economique : DU 3^{ème} ARRODISSEMENT**Président:** SAROURA BEYNE**Vice-Président:** AWAT ANOUR**Secrétaire Générale:** HOURMA ADAM**Les Conseillers**

- MAHAMAT-ZENE ISSAKIA
- ADAMOU BABA BARAO
- ANOUK AIRMIZI
- ISSAKIA BEN SAHIR

SOUS COMITE DES FEMMES DU 3^{ème} ARRODISSEMENT**Présidente:** HADJA SADA**Vice-Présidente:** HADJA MARIAM CHAIBOU**Secrétaire Générale:** FATOUMATA WADA**Secrétaire Générale Adjointe :** ACHTA ABAKAR Laure**Les Conseillers**

- KADJ MORO
- RAMATOU BAKO
- BATOU VONGORO
- SARIRATOU ROUFAY
- MME. FITA KONA MARIE JOSEPH
- MARIAM MOUSSA KALAMOU
- KENNA MARIE
- DEJONNE ODETTE
- RAUCHIDA MAMADOU

SOUS COMITE DE TRANSPORTEUR (TAXI MOTO) DU 8^{em} ARRONDISSEMENT

Président: MOUSSA CHAIBOU

Vice-Président: AMAIXOU SEIDOU

Secrétaire Général: ABOUDAKAR ALAMINE

Les Conseillers:

- KASSANE MAHAMAT
- DIIDA HASSANE

L'Ordre en joint dont émane le présent a été lavé à 17 h 55 min

Fait à Bangui, le 12 mars 2018

Le Président du Comité
MOUSSA CHAIBOU
Président du Comité

Le Secrétaire du Comité

KALISTE ANTOINE DIONG

KALISTE ANTOINE DIONG

Comité de Prévention
De Crise au PK5 dans le
3^{ème} Arrondissement
Tel : (00236) 73 65 33 51

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N° 002/2018

Dans la nuit du 7 au 8 Avril 2018 le PK5 dans le 3^{ème} arrondissement de Bangui a été le théâtre d'actes de violences tendant à fragiliser la paix et la cohésion obtenues au prix d'un effort déployé par la société civile, les autorités et la MINUSCA, malheureusement, et une fois de plus dans le cadre d'une opération de la MINUSCA visant à arrêter un responsable de groupe armé ayant échoué, la ville de Bangui en général et le PK5 en particulier sont replongés dans un chaos rappelant les moments les plus sombre de la crise.

C'est ainsi que le Km5 étant une zone urbaine et densément peuplée avec une population pour la plupart vulnérable (Femmes, Enfants, personnes âgées, personnes déplacées) a été transformé en véritable champs de bataille menaçant la vie de toute une population à travers des usages disproportionnés de la force de la part des deux camps en conflit.

Par ailleurs, le Comité de Prévention de Crise du 3^{ème} arrondissement condamne avec la dernière énergie l'option de la MINUSCA qui privilégie la force au détriment de la population civile.

Enfin, le Comité de Prévention de Crise du 3^{ème} arrondissement lance un appel urgent au Gouvernement et à la MINUSCA de privilégier le dialogue en vue trouver une solution pacifique à cette crise pour le bénéfice de la population civile.

Fait à Bangui, le 09 Avril 2018

Pour le Comité de Prévention de Crise

Le Rapporteur Général



KOLOSTRE ABDOULAYE DJONGO

MEMORANDUM

A

**La Très haute attention du Représentant Spécial
Du Secrétaire Générale de l'ONU,
Chef de la MINUSCA**

09.04.18
425

- Considérant la dernière crise survenue dans la nuit du 7 au 8 Avril 2018 au Pk5 dans le 3ème arrondissement de Bangui ;
- Considérant la densité de la population civile dans cette partie de la capitale ;
- Considérant le risque élevé de perte en vies humaines civiles d'une intervention militaire dans cette zone.

Nous, membres du Comité de Prévention de crise du 3^{ème} arrondissement, demandons ce qui suit :

- L'arrêt immédiat de l'opération en cours que nous dénonçons énergiquement de par sa nature à mettre en péril des centaines voire des milliers de vies innocentes ;
- La suppression de l'option du désarmement forcé qui se trouve être une option périlleuse pour la population civile ;
- L'ouverture d'un dialogue franc et serein entre les autodéfenses et le Gouvernement et la MINUSCA pour le rétablissement de la paix et de la sécurité entre ;
- D'inscrire les autodéfenses dans le processus DDR en vue d'un désarmement pacifique et volontaire.

Enfin, le Comité de Prévention de Crise du 3^{ème} arrondissement lance un appel urgent au Gouvernement et à la MINUSCA de privilégier le dialogue en vue trouver une solution pacifique à cette crise pour le bénéfice de la population civile.

Fait à Bangui, le 09 Avril 2018

Pour le Comité de Prévention de Crise


Le Rapporteur Général

KOLOSTRE ABDOULAYE DJONGO

Comité de Prévention De Crise au PK5 dans le 3^{ème} Arrondissement Tel : (0238) 75 06 33 51 / 75

Annex 5.2: Incitement to discrimination and violence against the Muslim community published on Facebook in April and May 2018.

Photographs available at: <https://www.facebook.com/groups/936076066415025/>, accessed on 30 June 2018. Some of the posts were subsequently removed by the website's administrators.





Screenshot sent to the Panel by a confidential source on 8 May 2018.




Annex 5.3: Extract of the “Analysis of the press articles including discourses and appeals to discrimination, hostility and violence”, as prepared by MINUSCA.

Auteur du discours	Moyen de diffusion	Contenus incriminés
Judes Zosse	L'Hirondelle du 26/04/2018 Titre : Nouveau massacre à Ippy: Des peulhs armés tirent sur une foule dans une cérémonie funéraire.	<i>« Jamais les autorités centrafricaines ne ramèneront les extrémistes des groupes armés à la raison par le dialogue. Des vrais barbares ni loi ni foi qui se croient tout permis. Leur seul remède c'est la force »</i>
Shalom Beraka	L'Hirondelle du 12/04/2018 Titre : Le feuilleton Djamous alias Force lève un coin de voile sur le rôle de la colonie tchadienne en RCA	<i>« Djamous fait partie de cette colonie, à la limite mégalomane, au réflexe sahélien brutal et belliqueux qui arrache la vedette à la communauté musulmane purement centrafricaine. Ces immigrants abusant de la solidarité, de l'hospitalité pour ne pas dire de la docilité des coreligionnaires nationaux, ils se sont arrogés le leadership à l'échelle communautaire. Ce positionnement relègue au second plan les intérêts des musulmans centrafricains »</i>
Elton Caleb	L'Hirondelle du 15/05/2018 Titre : Les arabes tchadiens en RCA et l'axe du mal	<i>« Par vocation, la RCA est réputée être une terre hospitalière. Sa nature laïque est, pour autant, une richesse. Sont de ce fait, centrafricain de souches, les communautés musulmanes Goula, Rounga, Kara, Youlou... si d'autres communautés musulmanes s'y sont associées, c'est logiquement par naturalisation ou par islamisation. C'est le cas des arabes tchadiens arrivés en Centrafrique par aventure, par nécessité de regroupement... Mais un fois en RCA, cette communauté s'est constituée, au fil du temps, en lobby islamiste pro-tchadien, devenant ainsi une grise pierre dans le jardin du pays de Boganda. De prime abord, c'est la communauté musulmane de Centrafrique qui en prend un sacré coup. Ces Tchadiens se sont fait passer pour des supers musulman, ostracisant les musulmans centrafricains de souche ainsi que les islamisés voire les musulmans d'autres nationalités installés en RCA »</i>
LC	Le citoyen du 15/05/2018 Titre : Centrafricains, centrafricaines, chers compatriotes : Voici la liste des douze apôtres du mal, ennemis de la république, complices des terroristes et mercenaires qui	<i>Le journal dresse une liste de 12 personnes d'origine étrangère, tchadienne et soudanaise notamment qui seraient à l'origine de la crise au km5.</i>

	s'organisent en ce moment pour déstabiliser la RCA.	
Guy Mbiyeo	Le pays du 14/05/2018 Titre : L'esprit de colère et de la vengeance continuent de dominer le caractère quotidien de la population de Bangui suite aux massacres à la paroisse de Fatima	« Dès lors, la conscience de la population lamda est bouleversé à tel enseigne que l'esprit de vengeance et de... se sont nettement imposés au cas où. [...] Pour l'honorable député de Bossangoa 2, les sujets musulmans qui ne se sentent pas concernés par la guerre sinon innocents doivent quitter le Km5. Le gouvernement doit prendre des mesures pour leur trouver un endroit protégé. Tous les extrémistes et criminels du Km5 seront tous neutralisés. Car, il faut racler cette zone avec un Caterpillar »
Jérémie Walanda	Le confident du 08/05/2018 Titre : Les terroristes du km5 continuent de semer la mort et la désolation dans les quartiers de Castors	« Les terroristes musulmans bien connus du km5 continuent en toute impunité de tuer et de massacrer les populations civiles non musulmanes aux quartiers de Castors, sous le regard impuissant du gouvernement et de la MINUSCA qui sont débordés par la puissance de feu satanique de ces agents du diable »
Makaya Mopaya	Le Démocrate du 07/05/2018	« En effet, depuis la prestation de serment du président Touadéra. [...] Le peuple africain en général et tout dernièrement les populations de PK5 sont prisonniers malgré eux, sur la terre de leurs aïeux et de leurs ancêtres de ces djihadistes et de ces terroristes venus du Darfour, Tchad, Niger et Soudan pour semer la terreur et faire basculer le pays dans une instabilité chronique politique et militaire qui ne dit pas son nom. Dans leur manœuvre de déstabilisation de la République ils ont réussi à créer une légion de mercenaires étrangers lourdement armés au KMS »
Benistant Mballa	Centrafrique matin du 23/05/2018	« Selon un responsable des Nations Unies, il y aura un génocide planifié en RCA. [...] Nimery Matar alias « Force » et ses éléments ont planifié et mis en exécution le génocide à la paroisse Notre Dame. [...] C'est toujours le schéma d'un génocide planifié et mis en exécution par Ali Darassa »

Annex 5.4: Caricature published by the CAR newspaper L'Eclaireur four times between 25 and 31 May 2018.



Annex 5.5: Transcription of the speech of Sylvain Ngoni, Member of Parliament from Bimbo, during the Prime Minister's question time on 1 May 2018.

Transcription obtained by the Panel from a confidential source.

Honorable Sylvain Ngoni Bimbo : (Sango) Le Km5 aujourd'hui est devenu le Tchad, avons-nous deux pays dans la RCA ? Selon mon observation ce que nous prenons comme une blague est en train de devenir la vérité. Nous, les députés, ne devons pas blaguer avec cela. La semaine passée, avec la population, nous étions en débandade. Nous sommes devenus bêtes avec nos populations. Aujourd'hui, au Km5 qui s'est transformé en Tchad, personne ne peut entrer, ni circuler. Ils chassent des frères qui résident encore là-bas pour acheter des maisons et ils ne construisent que des grosses maisons. Ceux qui viennent construire ces maisons et ce ministre, tu les connais ? actuellement, là-bas, ce n'est pas la RCA, mais le Tchad. Je sais qui sont nos frères, les Goula, les Rounga et les Banda Ndélé, nous les connaissons. Mais les Tchadiens qui sont venus ne sont pas nos frères. Aujourd'hui, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, vous « amusez » avec votre travail, nous les députés aujourd'hui, nous sommes fâchés parce que nous aidons le Président de la République et le Gouvernement ; mais ils n'ont pas rendu service à la population qui nous a élus. Aujourd'hui nous sommes appelés député, aujourd'hui quand vous passez, on vous honore comme ministre. Mais je demande, le 5 kilo d'aujourd'hui, un jour avec vous, il faudrait le bruler. Au niveau des quartiers Boeing, Kattin, jusqu'à Ramandji, est-ce que vous avez envoyé vos ministres contrôler ces personnes qui avaient fui ? On ne sait pas où ils demeurent ? De quartier Boulata, jusqu'à Boeing, il n'y a plus personne. Ces frères ont occupé tout le secteur. Personne du Gouvernement n'a cherché savoir où sont partie ces gens, des personnes souffrent. Le mois passé, les Arobo (musulmans) sont venus tenter d'attaquer la base de MINUSCA. De là, le palais (présidentielle) n'est pas loin. Ils sont en train de s'approcher pour y aller. Monsieur le Premier Ministre, je demande que, même si les policiers et les gendarme ne sont pas nombreux, ils doivent être basés à Catin, d'autre devant l'église Ali et l'entrée de la concession de l'aéroport pour que cette population soit en paix ; parce que rien ne les protège. Je vous demande, concernant le Km5, de trouver une stratégie pouvant consister à extraire ceux qui ne veulent pas rester au km5, de trouver un endroit pour eux et d'occuper (?) des bandits qui sont entrés dans 5 kilo. Je demande à mes frères les députés de se donner pour notre pays. A chaque fois que nous interpellons les Ministres, nous n'avons pas de bonne suite. La population au quartier nous demande « qu'est-ce que vous faites ? ». 5kilo tout le temps Tchad, c'est difficile, c'est difficile.

Annex 5.6: The High Commission of Communication.

The High Commission of Communication (HCC) was created in 2017 (Law N.17.006, 15 February 2017) to monitor the respect of the communication laws and to assure the independence and the freedom of press. The Commission is composed of nine members, of whom three are named by the President, the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate, and the others are elected by the professional associations. This should assure the independence of the HCC from the executive power.

Since the beginning of the year, the HCC has become an active player on media regulations. So far, the Commission has addressed a number of cases and issued sanctions – such as a warning and press ban – on individuals (Didacien Kossimatchi) and both national (Radio Ndeke Luka) and international (Radio France Internationale) media.

More recently, the HCC has launched, in collaboration with MINUSCA, a campaign to combat hate speech.³¹ On 30 June, the HCC adopted a National Action Plan on the prevention of public incitement to violence and hate speech in the country. However, the HCC has yet to take any decision on the discourses of incitement to discrimination and violence against the Muslim community.

³¹ Meeting with HCC President, Bangui, 7 June 2018.

Annex 5.7: Profile of the five main SDG leaders.**Nimeri Matar Djamouss alias "Force"**

Nimeri Matar Djamouss, alias "Force", is a former FACA soldier and "liberator" who supported the arrival of François Bozizé to power in 2003. He was the driver of Anatole Ngaya, former head of "Commando d'Intervention Rapide" (Rapid Intervention Unit) in the Presidential guard of François Bozizé. He integrated into the FACA and then joined the Séléka. After the departure of President Djotodia, he was stationed in Camp Béal until 2015 and later started operating as a militia leader in the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui. During that period, he was never formally a member of any armed group. Like other SDGs, he gained importance in PK5 after the departure of Hamit Tidjani and listed individuals Abdoulaye Hissène and Haroun Gaye from Bangui in August 2016 (S/2016/1032, para 65-67). "Force" collects taxes from the market and merchants. He commands around 80 elements who are mostly armed with automatic weapons. He has no clear political agenda, but he requests his reintegration within FACA. He has strong connections with some Government officials.

Youssouf Ayatoulah Adjaraye alias "You"

Youssouf Ayatoulah Adjaraye is based in Bulata. His weapons arsenal is significant, enabling his men to resist significant attacks and challenge the SDG of "Force" for the control of the PK5 market. His authority is well-respected within the area.

Mohamed Appo alias "Appo"

Mohamed Appo is based at Koudoukou Crossroads, with about 30 elements. His group uses small calibre rifles and grenades. Recently, the group was responsible for the abduction and killing of a FACA female officer enrolled in the DDR pilot project.

Djido alias "5 minutes"

Djido is the new leader of the 50/50 group, which had been created by Issa Kappy (alias "50/50"). He is based in the Cameroonian district of the PK5 area, with about 50 elements. He controls the New York, Cameroonian and Jamaican neighborhoods. His group uses AK47 assault rifles, grenades, RPG and automatic rifles. His relations with "Force" have been strained.

Moussa Kana alias "Moussa Danda"

Moussa Kana is based at Yakite Bridge, with about 25 elements. He took the name of the former leader of the SDG (Danda). The group uses small calibre rifles and grenades. It has lost most of its capacity and influence since the killing of its leader Abdoul Danda on 30 October 2016.

Additional information on SDGs can be found in the 2016 Panel's final report (S/2018/729S/2016/1032, para 77-83).

Annex 5.8: PK5 neighbourhood weaponry and arms trafficking.

1. Weaponry in the PK5 area

The episode of fighting in Bangui's 3rd district demonstrated the wide availability of conventional weapons and ammunition in the capital. From 8 April 2018 onwards, several grenades exploded in and around the 3rd district, and dozens of people from this district were seen carrying AK-type assault rifles and hand grenades, as illustrated in the picture below.³²

Photograph of individuals belonging to PK5 SDGs carrying AK-type assault rifles in and around Fatima Church on 1 May 2018; screenshots from a video obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 8 May 2018.



³² Phone discussion with eyewitness, 11 April 2018. Confidential reports, 11 April and 14, 22 May 2018.



On 8 April 2018, MINUSCA, FACA and ISF seized a number of weapons belonging to the armed elements of "Force". The few seized items were all non-functional.³³ It must be recalled that the weapons stockpile of "Force", as observed by the Panel in October 2016 and June 2018 (see S/2016/1032, annex 3.4), included machine guns, RPG launchers and numerous AK type assault rifles, and thus was much larger than the few seized items, as shown in the picture below.

Weapons and items belonging to the armed elements of Matar Anemeri, alias "Force" seized by MINUSCA on 8 April 2018 in Bangui's 3rd district, PK5 neighbourhood. Picture obtained from a confidential source on 8 April 2018.



³³ Confidential document, 8 April 2018.

2. Involvement of a peacekeeper in arms trafficking

On 13 April 2018, a MINUSCA peacekeeper from Gabon travelling on a motorcycle in civilian clothes was arrested by the national security forces in the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui while transporting ammunition.³⁴ According to several sources, the peacekeeper intended to sell 1,100 rounds of 7,62 mm ammunition to individuals linked to "Force" in PK5.³⁵ The peacekeeper had stolen the ammunition from the Gabonese contingent.³⁶ MINUSCA immediately condemned the actions of the suspect and launched an investigation into the alleged actions of the Gabonese blue helmet, who was repatriated.³⁷

Photograph of the MINUSCA peacekeeper and the ammunition obtained from a confidential source on 15 April 2018.



³⁴ MINUSCA press release, 14 April 2018.

³⁵ Confidential correspondence, 20 April 2018. <http://rjdh.org/centrafrique-le-pays-est-partie-civile-dans-le-proces-contre-le-gabonais-poursuivi-pour-traffic-de-munitions-darmes-de-guerre/>; <http://rjdh.org/centrafrique-un-casque-bleu-gabonais-arrete-par-la-gendarmerie-pour-vente-illicite-des-munitions-de-guerre/>, accessed on 22 April 2018.

³⁶ Confidential report, 14 April 2018.


³⁷ MINUSCA press release, 14 April 2018.

Photograph of the ammunition box found in the room of the peacekeeper. Source: confidential report, 14 April 2018.




Annex 6.1: Communiqués of FPRC.

Document obtained by the Panel on 3 April 2018 from a confidential source.



Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 9 April 2018.



Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 9 April 2018.

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE
DE CENTRAFRIQUE
BUREAU EXÉCUTIF NATIONAL
PRÉSIDENTIEL
NO. 0001 FPRC BENIN



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

Unité - Équité - Travail

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

Le Bureau politique du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) condamne avec la dernière énergie l'attaque perpétrée contre les éléments d'autodéfense qui ont défendu et qui continuent de défendre la mémoire résistante du km5 du génocide, par la MINUSCA, les FACA, la Gendarmerie et la Police occasionnant des pertes en vie humaines.

Ayant échoué dans leur mission, le gouvernement et la MINUSCA veulent à tout prix boycotter l'initiative africaine afin de parvenir à leurs besoins.

C'est pourquoi le bureau politique du FPRC exhorte le gouvernement et la MINUSCA d'observer une retenue afin que l'initiative africaine parvienne à son processus pour un retour définitif de la paix en Centrafrique.

Le Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique reste attaché à l'initiative africaine, seule issue de sortie de la crise centrafricaine et prend à témoin la Communauté Internationale, l'Union Africaine, la CEEAC, la CEMAC et la CIRGL de la politique du gouvernement avec l'appui de la MINUSCA, de faire replonger la RCA dans une crise confessionnelle.

Fait à Bangui le 08 Avril 2018



Le Vice-Président
LA NON-RECONNAISSANCE

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 4 May 2018.

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE
DE CENTRAFRIQUE
COORDINATION GENERALE
SECRETARIAT
N° 02/FPRC/CG/16-2018



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité-Dignité-Travail



**COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE DE LA COORDINATION GENERALE
DU FPRC**

La Coordination Générale du FPRC condamne avec toutes les énergies possibles les actes irresponsables perpétrés sur la paisible population de Bangui.

Le FPRC dément fermement l'accusation selon laquelle le CNDI regroupé à Kaga-Bandoro est responsable de ces actes.

Pour le FPRC, les événements violents qui se poursuivent sont les conséquences des opérations Sukula orchestrées par le Gouvernement sous prétexte qu'il cherche à démanteler les groupes des criminels et instaurer l'Autorité de l'Etat au Km5 ignorant les conséquences de tel acte.

Les citoyens de Bangui ont démontré la responsabilité du Gouvernement en transportant les corps vers le Palais de la Renaissance.

Aussi l'Archevêque de Bangui a demandé à la MINUSCA et au Gouvernement des explications sur les événements tragiques ayant entraîné la mort de beaucoup de civils dont l'Abbé TOUGOUMALE SABA, paix à son âme.

Le FPRC se pose la question : Constitutionnellement qui est le responsable de ces actes ?

Pour le FPRC, la gestion totalitaire de l'Etat a toujours ce genre de conséquence.

Dans son idéologie, le FPRC ne défend que des Droits, lutte pour la Paix, l'Unité et la Renaissance de Centrafrique.

Fait à N'dele, le 03/05/2018

Le Coordinateur Général



[Signature]
DIJAFAR ADJOM

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E-mail : coordinationgenerale2018@gmail.com
Tel : (+236) 75 93 97 95

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 7 May 2018.

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE

DE CENTRAFRIQUE

COORDINATION GENERALE

SECRETARIAT

N° 1/TPRC/CG/SG-2018



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE



COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE DE LA COORDINATION GENERALE DU FPRC

Suite aux questions se posent sur le regroupement des ex-sédués à Kaga-Bandoro, le FPRC rappelle l'opinion nationale et internationale qu'il est de la coutume dans un milieu normal les hommes se réunissent pour réfléchir, échanger et prendre des décisions qui s'imposent afin de chercher des solutions aux problèmes.

Le FPRC s'est réuni à Kaga-Bandoro suite à la récente dérive politique du régime en place. À titre de rappel, l'histoire démontre que l'émergence des révoltes en République Centrafricaine est toujours due à la mauvaise gouvernance des dirigeants politiques et demeure jusqu'à ce jour. En d'autre terme, le non-respect de la Constitution par les dirigeants politiques.

Pour le FPRC, suite aux déclarations des illustres autorités du pays qualifiant les acteurs politico-militaires de bandits et de criminels seront mis hors d'état de nuire et la mise en exécution de leur menace entraînant la mort de beaucoup de civils nécessite la prise des dispositions nécessaires du CNDS.

Le FPRC s'étonne des voix limitant les zones de circulation au Conseil National de Défense et Sécurité en abrégé CNDS (branche armée du FPRC) et, en outre aucune loi ni un texte interdisant aux centrafricains de circuler du Nord au Sud, de l'Est à l'Ouest et vice versa. Plus pire encore, pourquoi interdire aux centrafricains du Nord d'aller au Sud ? et d'autre encore interdits d'aller ou de circuler dans la capitale ? N'est-il pas une tendance à la xénophobie, à la croisade ?

Le FPRC se pose toujours des questions suivantes :

- 1-Y a-t-il une zone délimitée au CNDS?
- 2- Qui détient le monopole de la Centrafrique?
- 3-Pourquoi dit-on Centrafrique pays de ZO KWE ZO?

Le FPRC reste attaché à l'Initiative de l'Union Africaine qui demeure le seul espoir de la Renaissance de la Centrafrique.

Fait à N'dele, le 06/05/2018

Le Coordinateur Général



[Signature]
DJAFAR ADOUM

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Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 18 May 2018.

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE
DE CENTRAFRIQUE
COORDINATION GENERALE
SECRETIARIAT
N° FPRC/CG/SG-2018



**COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE DE LA COORDINATION GENERALE
DU FPRC**

Par rapport à l'évolution et à l'analyse de la situation politique en RCA, le FPRC déplore l'attitude passive et négative des dirigeants actuels qui a pour conséquence la persistance de la crise qui nécessite une politique de reconstruction urgente. Le Gouvernement reste quoi et ne réagit pas positivement devant cette situation. A titre d'exemple : à l'intérieur même de la capitale, des barrières sont érigées entravant la libre circulation des biens et des personnes.

Le FPRC regrette l'attitude négative envers les autorités supérieures de la Nation.

Le FPRC note l'existence partielle de l'Autorité politique mettant en cause la dignité du Chef de l'Etat.

Le FPRC attaché au système et au principe de la paix s'accorde à la démarche de l'Union Africaine pour la résolution définitive de la crise centrafricaine.

Le FPRC condamne avec toutes les énergies possibles les violences perpétrées partout dans le pays.

Le FPRC demande au Gouvernement à quand la date du Dialogue inclusif tant attendu ?

Le FPRC souhaite que l'Union Africaine et certaines organisations internationales accélèrent le processus de la résolution de la crise en Centrafrique que le Gouvernement tente de rendre confessionnelle.

Le FPRC rejette l'idée de la crise confessionnelle, dénonce la xénophobie et appelle la population à la vigilance.

Le FPRC s'inquiète de la préoccupation de la Communauté Internationale faisant état de ce que ce sont les groupes armés qui déstabilisent le pays, or en réalité c'est la Communauté Internationale avec leur Vieille Politique et, la mauvaise gouvernance, la marginalisation et l'injustice sociale prônées par les régimes successifs qui sont à l'origine de la persistance de la violence en Centrafrique.

Les centrafricains sont capables pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique.

La Communauté Internationale doit renoncer à l'ambiguïté.

Fait à N'dole, le 17/05/2018



Le Coordinateur Général

[Signature]
DIAFAR ADOM

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Annex 6.2: Communiqués on the cooperation of MPC and FPRC.

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 4 May 2018.



PAIX

MPC
UNITE

03 AVR 2018

LIBERTE

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

Le 03 MAI 2018 à 08H00 S'est tenue une réunion extraordinaire au siège du mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) sise quartier Abakar à KAGA BANDORO, sous la présidence du **General ALKATIM MAHAMAT** l'ordre du jour était la réorganisation du Bureau politique

Il est décidé ce qui suit :

ABAKAR SABONE Secrétaire General

GHISLAIN BRIA Coordonateur General

ABOULKASSIM ALGONI TIDJANI Coordonateur GI adjt.

ALI YACKOUB SANOUSI Porte parole

Le présent communiqué prend effet immédiatement et prions l'opinion national et international de veiller sur la stricte conformité de cette décision


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MINUSCA

UNION AFRICAINE

PRESSE

ARCHIVES




Fait à Kaga Bandoro, le 03 Mai 2018



Le Général **ALKATIM MAHAMAT**

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 4 May 2018.



V. Interdiction formelle aux civils de circuler avec un arme dans le
zone

VI. En dehors de la ville de Kaga-Bandoro, l'ordre de Mission sera signé
par les Com-Zone des différentes localités.

Fait à Kaga-Bandoro, le 11/01/2018

Dni Signé :

LES RESPONSABLES MILITAIRE

Excellence ABDOULAYE ISSENE



Gnl ALKHATIM MAHAMAT

Gnl SALEH AZABADI

Gnl AL ISSEL KHALIL

Gnl OUMAR KAFINE



Annex 6.3: Ex-Séléka weaponry and arms trafficking.

1. Acquisition of weaponry by ex-Séléka factions

Since late January 2018, there have been a growing number of reports of FPRC and UPC arms-trafficking activities, in particular from Am Dafok and Sikki Kede (Vakaga prefecture) to the towns of Ndélé, Bria, Kaga-Bandoro, Bokolbo and beyond.³⁸

The influx of weapons in the area has resulted in UPC and FPRC elements increasingly seen as carrying pistols and AK-type assault rifles, for example as observed by the Panel in the Ouaka prefecture, Bria, Kaga-Bandoro, Ndélé and its surroundings.³⁹ In March, Nourredine Adam, Abdoulaye Hissène and Haroun Gaye had travelled in and out of Ndélé with several vehicles with machine guns mounted atop and accompanied by an estimated 300 fighters, armed with both pistols and AK-type assault rifles, in preparation for the meeting with the AU's Panel of Facilitators on 27 March 2018.⁴⁰ The reported origin of both the vehicles and the weapons is the territory of the Sudan.

In its previous reports, the Panel highlighted that Sudanese armed fighters and weaponry entered the CAR in support of the FPRC-led coalition (S/2017/1023, para. 172 and S/2017/639, annex 5.9). In October 2017, the Sudanese authorities launched the forcible phase of a disarmament campaign to eliminate illegal weapons in the Darfur region.⁴¹ To rapidly obtain important volumes of weaponry, sanctioned individual Abdoulaye Hissène reactivated his connections with Sudanese individuals eager to sell their weapons.⁴²

Given the oversupply of available weapons, Hissène began to act as an intermediary between the Sudanese traffickers and the UPC as well as with other armed groups, including anti-balaka groups (see below).⁴³ In April, the Panel was informed that UPC had acquired Sudanese weapons, including 200 AK-type assault rifles, six machine guns and 25,000 rounds of ammunition, through a deal with Abdoulaye Hissène.⁴⁴ In mid-June, the Panel was provided with pictures of the weapons (see below) and informed that new weapons deals were being concluded by UPC with Sudanese traffickers directly.⁴⁵

In Bria, the Panel also noticed a substantive upgrade in the weapons arsenal of "General Bokassa"'s anti-balaka group. The approximately 20 armed fighters observed by the Panel

³⁸ Confidential report, 23 and 30 March 2018; confidential reports, February-April 2018; confidential report, 5 June 2018.

³⁹ Panel's mission to Ouaka prefecture, 19-24 January 2018. Panel's mission to Ndélé and Akroussoulbak, 3-5 April 2018. Panel's mission to Bria, 8-11 June 2018.

⁴⁰ Panel's mission to Ndélé and Akroussoulbak, 3-5 April 2018; Correspondence with confidential source, 2 April 2018.

⁴¹ Meeting with diplomatic sources, 6 April 2018;
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article63860>;

<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article64857>, accessed on 30 June 2018.

⁴² Meeting with confidential sources, 27 March and 15 June 2018.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Meeting with diplomatic sources, Bangui, 6 April 2018.

⁴⁵ Meetings with confidential sources, 27 March, 22 May, 4 and 16 June 2018.

in Bria all carried an AK-type assault rifles reportedly purchased from a Sudanese arms trafficker.⁴⁶

In a communiqué dated 31 May 2018, the Sudanese Embassy in Bangui noted that “the presence of mercenaries of Sudanese nationality within the ranks of armed groups has nothing to do with the Sudanese Government which is a State institution” (see below).

2. UPC fighters equipped with conventional arms, military uniforms and satellite phones

Photographs taken by the Panel in Maloum, Bokolbo and Djoubissi; Panel's mission to Ouaka prefecture from 19-24 January 2018.



⁴⁶ Meeting with confidential source, Bria, 9 June 2018.



3. FPRC vehicles and FPRC elements with AK-type assault rifles, pistols and machine guns in the Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture

Photographs of new FPRC vehicles and armed FPRC elements in new military attire, with sanctioned individual Haroun Gaye. Pictures obtained from a confidential source on 29 March 2018.





Photograph of FPRC fighter in Akoursoulbak taken by the Panel on 5 April 2018.



4. Weapons and ammunition reportedly purchased by UPC from Sudanese arms traffickers

Photographs obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 12 March and 19 June 2018.



5. Press Communiqué from the Embassy of the Sudan in Bangui, 31 May 2018.

COOPÉRATION	Ambassade de la République du Soudan Bangui Tél. 236 613821-76209391 B.P. 1351		سفارة جمهورية السودان بانجاي هاتون : 236613821+ ص. ب. : 1351
COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE			
Se référant au mémorandum de la plateforme des confessions religieuses publié dans les journaux privés en date du 28 mai 2018 concernant la situation sécuritaire persistant depuis 2012 jusqu'à ce jour, parle de la présence des mercenaires soudanais et tchadiens parmi les groupes armés opérant sur le territoire centrafricain et recommande à ces deux pays d'arrêter de s'ingérer dans les affaires intérieures de la République Centrafricaine.			
L'Ambassade du Soudan à Bangui dénonce avec fermeté cette fausse accusation et saisit cette occasion pour éclairer l'opinion nationale et internationale de ce qui suit :			
• Le Gouvernement du Soudan s'est engagé avec détermination dans la politique de bon voisinage avec la RCA, en entretenant des efforts pour maintenir cette excellente relation, il a pris l'initiative de signer en 2011 le protocole de la force tripartite (Soudan -- Tchad -- RCA) en vue de contrôler la frontière commune de ces trois Etats.			
Pour la réussite de la mission de la force tripartite, le Gouvernement du Soudan prend l'engagement d'envoyer chaque six (06) mois un avion militaire pour transporter les forces armées centrafricaines.			
• La République du Soudan est soucieuse d'un prompt retour de la sécurité et de la stabilité en République Centrafricaine.			
La République du Soudan a exprimé sa disponibilité à aider la République Centrafricaine dans la médiation avec les groupes armés, sous l'égide de l'Union Africaine ainsi, le Soudan fait partie fait partie du panel des experts africains pour la médiation auprès des groupes armés.			
• La présence des mercenaires de nationalité soudanaise au sein des groupes armés n'a rien avoir avec le Gouvernement Soudanais qui est une institution étatique.			
Vu les relations historiques et fraternelles, le Gouvernement du Soudan ne peut pas se permettre de s'ingérer négativement dans la crise centrafricaine.			
L'Ambassade de la République du Soudan à Bangui est mécontent et demande aux médias, aux organisations non gouvernementales et gouvernementales de ne pas promouvoir des allégations qui affectent négativement les relations entre ces deux pays frères.			
			
Page 8	Le Confident N° 4425 du 31 Mai 2018		

Annex 6.4: FPRC parallel administration.

1. FPRC Financial Management Committee in Haute Kotto

1.1 Organizational chart

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 15 February 2018.

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE
DE LA CENTRAFRIQUE
SEMPLOI D'EMPLOI NATIONAL
PRESIDENT
MAHAT GABRIEL GABRIEL
CONSEIL NATIONAL DE DEFENSE ET DE
SECURITE
GP 012 FPRC/2018

Republique Centrafricaine
Fais - Agence - Fais

FPRC

NOTE DE SERVICE

A compter de la date de signature de la présente note de service, les personnes dont les noms suivent sont nommés aux postes ci-dessous.

Il s'agit de :

A-COMITE DE GESTION FINANCIERE DE LA HAUTE-KOTTO

- 1-) Président : MAHAMAT SEID ABDELKADI
- 2-) Vice-président : MAHAMAT ALI SELEKA
- 3-) Secrétaire General : BILAL AMANE
- 4-) Secrétaire General Adjoint : NASSIR KARAMA
- 5-) Trésorier General : OUMAR TIDJANI
- 6-) Trésorier General Adjoint : AMADOU OUSMANE
- 7-) Contrôleur Financier : MOUJIA MISSI
- 8-) Contrôleur Financier Adjoint : MAHAMAT-ZENE ABACHE

B- DIRECTION REGIONAL DES MINES

Directeur Régional : NISSEN ZACKARIA

Fait à Bira le 02 février 2018

Le Président du Conseil National de Défense et de Sécurité


ABDOULAYE ISSENE RAMADAN

1.2 Taxation system

"General" Mahmat Seid, President of the Financial Management Committee in Haute-Kotto, provided the Panel with the following information regarding the functioning of the administration under his control:

- The so-called "tax office" collects tolls from all traders and merchants. For instance, depending on the size of the trucks, each truck owner pays between FCFA 200,000 and 300,000 (USD\$350 - 530) per year to operate in the Haute-Kotto prefecture.
- Customs offices in Bria check whether economic operators coming from abroad (mainly Sudanese) have paid their taxes at FPRC customs offices in Tissi and Am Dafock (Vakaga prefecture).
- The "coffee trade" office collects taxes from coffee traders (mainly from the Sudan) who buy coffee in the CAR. The traders pay taxes at 3 levels: in Bambari (FCFA 25,000, \$44), in Bria (FCFA 15 000, \$26) and in Am Dafok (FCFA 15,000, \$26). The revenues generated by tolls from the coffee trade is shared between UPC and FPRC.
- The phytosanitary services check of food delivered in Bria and collect taxes from the traders delivering the food.
- Livestock: Revenues generated from the livestock market in Bria are collected by UPC. Part of the revenues is shared with FPRC.

1.3 Copies of receipts delivered by FPRC structures

Documents obtained by the Panel from "General" Mahmat Seid on 11 June 2018.

FRONT PATRONS POUR LA REUNIFICATION DE CENTRAFRICAINE SECRETARIAT GENERAL DIRECTION SANITAIRE		REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE UNITE-DIGITE-TRAVAIL N° 100651	
RECU PHITO SANITAIRE N°			
Nom du patient :			
Municipalité :			
Marché :			
Direction :		Provenance :	
LE RESPONSABLE			

Similar parallel structures have been established by FPRC in other prefectures (see Panel's midterm report for the case of the Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture; S/2017/629; para. 71 and annex 5.10). "General" Mahmat Seid told the Panel that FPRC political coordinator Djafar Adouma and listed individual Haroun Gaye were heading the Financial Management Committees in the Bamingui-Bangoran and Vakaga prefectures, respectively.⁴⁷

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Annex 6.5: FPRC parallel mining administration in Ndélé (Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture).

1. FPRC mining brigade in Ndélé

The FPRC mining brigade collects taxes on various mining activities (gold and diamonds), as well as on trade of other commodities like cement and oil.⁴⁸ The head of the mining brigade is Abdullaye Ataïp.

The main diamond sites controlled by FPRC in the Ndélé area are located in Ndao (45 kilometers of Ndélé), Manovo (40 kilometers east of Ndélé), Sangha-Carrière (85 kilometers south-east of Ndélé), and Gounda (200 kilometers north-east of Ndélé). Gold sites are located on the Ndélé-Birao axis (25 kilometers of Ndélé).

2. Documentation of the FPRC mining brigade (licenses and register)

Documents obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 5 April 2018.

Copy of a license issued to mine workers by FPRC in Ndélé.



⁴⁸ Meeting with a member of the FPRC mining brigade, Ndélé, 5 April 2018; meeting with representative of the mining administration, Ndélé, 5 April 2018.

Excerpts from the registers of the FPRC mining brigade in Ndélé, reflecting the names of mine workers and artisanal miners who have paid their taxes to the armed group.

LISTES DES ARTISANS MINIERES DE					
NOM	PRENOM	PROFESSION	Montant de la taxe	DATE DE VERIFICATION	REMARQUES
1	AMAT	ARTISAN	10.000F		
2	AMAT	ARTISAN	10.000F		
3	AMAT	ARTISAN	10.000F		
4	AMAT	ARTISAN	10.000F		
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LISTES DES OUVRIERS MINIERES					
NOM	PRENOM	CONFECTIONNEMENT	DATE DE VERIFICATION	REMARQUES	REMARQUES
1	AMAT	OUVRIER	26/02/2018		
2	AMAT	OUVRIER	26/02/2018		
3	AMAT	OUVRIER	26/02/2018		
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Annex 6.6: UPC parallel mining administration in Ouaka prefecture.

1. Organizational chart and taxation system

The UPC mining administration is reportedly composed of two levels⁴⁹ :

- A central management team reportedly based in Bokolobo and working closely with UPC chief Ali Darassa. Abdoulaye Hamidoulaye is believed to be one of the team leaders.
- Local managers, including a head of the mining service in Bambari (Adamou Ngatoua) and regional directors. Abdoul Shafi Abakar Youssouf is reportedly the UPC regional director in Ndassima.

UPC has also established a mining brigade which documents whether miners and collectors have paid their taxes and obtained their licenses from the UPC administration. Artisanal miners reportedly pay between FCFA 50,000 and 62,000 (\$91 and \$110) per year to operate on the Ndassima mining site.⁵⁰ The level of taxes has increased since the control of the site was shared among UPC and FPRC. Collectors reportedly pay around FCFA 450,000 (\$795) per year. Racketeering of gold extracted by the miners and arbitrary penalties constitute additional tolls for miners.

2. Mining sites under UPC control

In the context of UPC's resurgence in the Ouaka prefecture, the armed group has regained control over several mining sites which had been lost to anti-balaka combatants.⁵¹ This includes the gold site of Ndassima, where UPC shares control and revenues with FPRC. Furthermore, UPC maintains control over diamond sites in the Ngakobo area and gold sites in Agoudou-Manga. UPC also supervises activities of a newly-discovered diamond mining site located in the vicinity of Bambari, in the Wangaye neighbourhood.

UPC is also trying to regain control over mining sites located in the Bakala area, which to date have remained under control of anti-balaka local leaders including "General Réal", "Chien Méchant" and "Risqueur".

⁴⁹ Meeting with confidential sources, artisanal miners and economic operators, Bambari, 30 April-2 May 2018.

⁵⁰ Idem.

⁵¹ Panel's mission in Bambari, 30 April-2 May 2018.

3. Copies of receipts delivered by UPC

Documents obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 23 May 2018.



As indicated above, FPRC and UPC share control over the Ndassima mining site, hence the mention of FPRC on the receipt below signed by UPC element Abdoul Shafi Abakar Youssouf.





Annex 6.8: Pictures of victims of the anti-balaka attack on the Fulani camp in Mbaidou.

Photographs obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 30 April 2018.



Annex 6.9: Pictures of Tagbara and Séko after the clashes of 3 April 2018.

Photographs of Tagbara obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 8 April 2018.





Photographs of the mass graves in Séko obtained by the Panel from a confidential source and taken by the Panel on 1st May 2018.



Annex 6.10: Deadly attacks against peacekeepers from 1 January to 21 June 2018.

Information obtained by the Panel from a confidential source.

3 April 2018 – Tagbara (Ouaka prefecture)

At approximately 5:30 a.m., anti-balaka combatants attacked the MINUSCA base in Tagbara, resulting in the death of one Mauritanian peacekeeper and 11 others injured. MINUSCA Force exchanged fire with the attackers that lasted for one hour and a half.

10 April 2018 – Bangui

From 4 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., MINUSCA Force and armed elements from the PK5 neighbourhood engaged in an intensive exchange of fire in the 3rd district. The firefight resulted in one Rwandan peacekeeper being killed and eight injured.

17 May 2018 – Alindao (Basse Kotto prefecture)

At around 9 a.m., approximately 27 km southeast of Alindao, anti-balaka combatants attacked a MINUSCA escorted convoy which was coming from Dimbi to Alindao. One Mauritanian peacekeeper was killed and seven injured, including four seriously.

3 June 2018 – Dilapoko (Mambéré-Kadéï prefecture)

At 4:30 p.m., at approximately 5 km south of Dilapoko (80 km north of Berberati), armed Siriri elements ambushed and opened fire on a MINUSCA Force patrol coming from Gamboula. MINUSCA Force returned fire. Upon the exchange of fire, one Tanzanian peacekeeper was killed and seven injured.

10 June 2018 – Bambari (Ouaka prefecture)

At 5:45 p.m., anti-balaka opened fire at a vehicle with two Burundian peacekeepers, injuring both. At 1:25 a.m. on 11 June, one of the peacekeepers died due to severe injuries.

Annex 7.1: Armed groups in the west of the CAR.

The presence of armed groups in the western part of the country continues to grow. Three of the four prefectures bordering the frontier with Cameroon witnessed important armed group activities. On 12 March 2018, Cameroon deployed the newly formed 12th Motorized Infantry Brigade based in Bertoua. This new operational unit was created by the President of the Republic of Cameroon to secure the border with the CAR where numerous armed groups operate.

The armed groups, while not having a well-defined political agenda, generate revenues through transhumance and undertake activities of illegal taxation.

1. Siriri

The Mamberei-Kadei prefecture has witnessed the creation and development of a group called Coalition Siriri ("Peace" in Sango). Former UPC members and new recruits mainly from the Fulani community comprise this group.⁵² Their proclaimed goal is to protect the cattle owners targeted by local anti-balaka groups in the area west of Berberati. The armed group seems well organized with ID cards (see below) issued for each member as well as a defined chain of command, headed by General Djaligue and his second General Djibril (a former UPC Zone Commander).⁵³

In January 2018, Siriri established connections with FDPC and 3R. They held meetings in the town of Nguia-Bouar near the Cameroon border. The results of those meetings remain unclear, but elements of FDPC are now conducting operations with Siriri and the two groups operate in the same area without conflict. The FDPC État major publicly denied any agreement with Siriri,⁵⁴ but an alliance between the two groups could facilitate control of a greater territory where illegal taxation on transhumance and mining activities represent an important source of revenue.⁵⁵

The UPC and Siriri maintain strong ties and at the time of the drafting of this report, discussions were ongoing for a possible absorption of a branch of Siriri into the UPC. This is partly due to internal tensions within Siriri. Siriri's expansion towards Nana-Mambéré prefecture generated tensions with local authorities and several clashes with MINUSCA forces. During one of those clashes, on 3 June 2018, one Tanzanian peacekeeper was killed, as well as a Siriri leader.⁵⁶ As the Siriri leadership in the Mambéré-Kadei prefecture is reluctant to face the political and military consequences of actions undertaken by the group's branch active in the Nana-Mambéré prefecture, they consider disassociating themselves by joining UPC.

⁵² Meeting with UPC representative, Bangui, 27 April 2018.

⁵³ Confidential report, 26 March 2018.

⁵⁴ Meeting with Nana-Mambéré Prefect, Bouar, 25 March 2018.

⁵⁵ Meeting with Abdoulaye Miskine, Brazzaville, 18 April 2018.

⁵⁶ Confidential report, 4 June 2018.

Photograph provided to the Panel by MINUSCA on 27 March 2018.



2. Peace agreement between 3R and the Ndalé brothers

Under the peace agreement signed on 15 December 2017 (see below), obstacles to freedom of movement are banned, and armed groups' combatants shall not carry weapons openly.

This peace agreement enabled the establishment of clear division of territories between the two groups where they have put in place illegal taxation on transhumance alongside a system of fees and penalties including taxes at roadblocks and on markets for traders. This system weighs heavily on the cattle owners who are constantly forced to cede part of their herds, especially in territories controlled by the 3R (one penalty may represent the confiscation of up to 6 beefs).⁵⁷

Document provided to the Panel by a confidential source on 22 December 2017.

"hd" Centre de
Documentation
Dakar

ACTE D'ENGAGEMENT ENTRE LES GROUPES

ANTI-BALAKAS DE LA NANA-HAMBÉRE

ET LES

3R

(RETOUR, RECLAMATION, REHABILITATION)

⁵⁷ Meeting with confidential source, 2 April 2018.

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PREAMBULE

Nous, Adamou Sylvain GBOKAO NDALE et SIDIKI ABBASSI, représentants respectivement les groupes armés 3R (Retour, Réclamation, Réhabilitation) et les Anti-Balakas dans la préfecture de la Nana-Mambéré, ci-après « les Parties » ;

Considérant les initiatives précédentes prises par la communauté internationale en vue d'instaurer un règlement négocié des hostilités en RCA, signé le 23 juillet 2014 à Brazzaville ;

Considérant les efforts de la MINUSCA dans le cadre de son mandat de soutenir les autorités de la Centrafrique en général et les autorités de la Nana-Mambéré en particulier pour la paix et la réconciliation dans le pays ;

Considérant la dynamique nationale, notamment celle des forces vives de la nation y compris la plateforme des Autorités religieuses, la société civile et les partis politiques à construire une société de paix et de concorde nationale en soutien au processus de Réconciliation nationale ;

Considérant les Recommandations du Forum National de Bangui du 04 au 11 mai 2015 dont les plus importantes sont consignées dans le Pacte républicain pour la paix, la Réconciliation Nationale et la Reconstruction en RCA ;

Considérant la volonté constante de son excellence, le professeur Faustin Archange TOUADERA, chef de l'Etat, réitérée dans ses différentes déclarations (Investiture du 30 mars 2016, Kigali, Bruxelles) et les dernières adresses à la nation du 31 décembre 2016 et du 1 décembre 2017, de promouvoir le dialogue et la réconciliation nationale de tous les fils et toutes les filles de Centrafrique ;

Exprimant notre profond regret quant aux violations persistantes des Accords précédents de cessez-le-feu et de cessation des hostilités, ainsi que les pertes déplorables de vies et de biens engendrées par les derniers conflits ;

Conscients du fait que sans notre engagement aux principes cardinaux de bonne gouvernance, de tolérance, et de coexistence pacifique, les populations de la préfecture de la Nana-Mambéré ne peuvent réaliser, ni une croissance globale ni des progrès sociaux économiques pour les générations actuelles et futures ;

Conscients du fait que la responsabilité de déterminer le destin de notre région nous incombe, selon les réalités de notre pays et sur la base des valeurs de justice, d'état de droit, de démocratie, de bonne gouvernance, du respect des droits et libertés fondamentaux de la personne, d'unité et de solidarité, d'entente mutuelle et de coopération parmi les différentes communautés ethniques, et groupes religieux ;



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Réaffirmant notre engagement à renoncer à la violence et décidant, par la présente, de nous inscrire résolument dans la dynamique de paix, de cohésion sociale, de réconciliation et du bien-être des populations de la Nana-Mambéré ;

Par la signature du présent acte, nous prenons l'engagement solennel devant les autorités gouvernementales, les représentants de la MINUSCA et les populations, de renoncer à toute action de notre part pouvant porter atteinte à la sécurité et au bien-être des populations.

Nous convenons de ce qui suit:

Article 1 Les Parties s'engagent à un accord de non-agression à compter de la date de signature du présent acte (si après Accord).

Article 2 Dès la signature de l'Accord, les Parties sont tenues d'observer conjointement un ordre inconditionnel de cessez-le-feu et de cessation des hostilités ou des agressions contre le personnel armé de l'une et de l'autre partie, et contre les populations civiles de toutes les localités de la Nana-Mambéré.

Article 3 Dès la signature de l'Accord, l'usage des armes, ainsi que les actes offensifs tels que : l'incendie des villages et greniers, le vol de bétail, le lancement de nouvelles attaques contre les civils et le fait de commettre tout autre acte pouvant constituer ou faciliter une violation de l'Accord doivent cesser de suite.

Article 4 Dans les trente (30) jours qui suivent la date d'entrée en vigueur de l'Accord, les Parties établissent avec l'appui du Centre HD:

1. Un réseau d'échange d'informations composé des leaders communautaires avec l'implication des leaders des Parties ;
2. Une cartographie détaillée qui définira :
 - Les zones à partir desquelles ou vers lesquelles les groupes doivent se retirer ;
 - Les zones démilitarisées devant servir de zone tampon entre les combattants armés respectifs des Parties. Une zone démilitarisée dans le

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sens de cet article est une zone sans base temporaire ou permanente des Parties.

Article 5 Les Parties sous la supervision du Centre HD définissent ensemble avec les leaders communautaires, les conditions pour le fonctionnement de ces mécanismes locaux de prévention et de gestion des problèmes liés à la violence en cas d'agression ou d'intimidation, de l'extorsion et du vol de bétail, souvent sources de tensions intercommunautaires et d'affrontements sanglants entre les Parties.

Article 6 Le convoi des animaux doit être accompagné par un Certificat d'Origine à l'intérieur de la Nana-Mambéré ou à partir de la Nana-Mambéré vers les autres localités de la RCA afin de mieux contrôler le mouvement de bétail et d'éviter les cas de vol.

Article 7 L'engagement des Parties pour la paix, la réconciliation et la cohésion sociale sous-entend entre autre :

- a) La libre circulation des personnes et des biens y compris des organisations humanitaires dans la Nana-Mambéré;
- b) L'accès libre aux établissements de santé, tels que les hôpitaux et les postes médicaux ;
- c) L'accès libre aux établissements scolaires et à tout autre édifice public ;
- d) L'engagement pour le retour de tous les déplacés dans la Nana-Mambéré du aux hostilités entre les Parties;
- e) L'abstention d'atteinte aux biens et propriétés privés (maisons, motos, parcelles agricoles, bétails, etc.) ;
- f) Le recours aux mécanismes traditionnels locaux des règlements des conflits en cas de litiges liés à l'exploitation des ressources naturelles;
- g) Le recours systématique au réseau d'échange, établi par cet accord en cas de disputes.

Article 8 Les Parties s'engagent à respecter et à mettre en exécution les dispositions de l'Accord afin d'assurer avec succès, l'instauration et la

consolidation de la paix et de la cohésion sociale dans la préfecture de la Nana-Mambéré.

Article 9 Dès la signature de l'Accord, les Parties, prennent individuellement et collectivement, des mesures conjointes spécifiques pour sensibiliser leurs combattants et partisans respectifs et les populations en général des localités concernées, pour qu'ils cessent des actes hostiles les uns contre les autres et tout autre acte apte de mettre en danger la paix dans la Nana-Mambéré tels que les actes sur la base de l'ethnicité, de la religion et de toutes autres motivations, y compris l'intimidation, les prises d'otage, l'extorsion ou vol, l'usage de propagandes hostiles et l'incitation pouvant porter atteinte à la vie ou causer des dégâts aux biens.

Article 10 Les termes de l'Accord doivent être simultanément communiqués à la population civile par les radios locales, la presse écrite ainsi que par d'autres moyens de communication.

Article 11 Les Parties conviennent de se réunir mensuellement dans le cadre du réseau d'échange établi par cet Accord comme mesure de rétablissement de confiance entre les Parties.


Article 12 Le présent Accord entre en vigueur dès sa signature.

Fait à Bouar (Nana-Mambéré), le 14 Décembre 2017

Pour le groupe ANTI-BALAKA
représenté par
M. Adamou Sylvain GBOKAO
NDALÉ



Pour le groupe 3R représenté
par
M. SIDIKI ABASSI


SIDIKI ALIYOU


6 sur 6

Témoins


M. Jonas DONOH
Membre de l'Assemblée Nationale




M. Amadou ISSA BI ADAMOU
Conseiller du Chef de l'Etat en Matière
de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage




M. Alexis NAGUEZANGBA
Préfet de la Nana-Mambéré



M. Paul Shaba BAGAZA YADERE
Sous-Préfet de Bouar




M. Lazare NAMBENA
Président de la Délégation Spéciale de
la Ville de Bouar



M. Roger GODONGAI
Commandant de la FACA dans la Nana-
Mambéré




Mme. Christine KAPALATA
Chef de Bureau de la MINUSCA à
Bouar



**CST LANHAGUE
TANDOR**

M. Augustin KOULAS
Représentant du Centre pour le
Dialogue Humainitaire (HD)



3. Confrontation between Bahar's MLNC and Sayo's RJ in the Paoua area

Since 2016, the Paoua sub-prefecture had been under the control of a coalition of RJ led by Armel Sayo and an MPC faction led by "General" Ahmat Bahar (S/2016/694 para 91), which became the MNLC in October 2017. This cooperation was based on the sharing of resources from the illegal checkpoints and the transhumance activities coming from Chad.⁵⁸ Officially the RJ split into two branches in 2016 (S/2016/1032, para 208-2012) – one under Sayo, the other under colonel Belanga - but this separation had no impact from an operational point of view, as both branches continued to operate in the field under "General" Luther, Sayo's Chief of Staff.

Tensions between MNLC and RJ grew in late 2017 as a result of the continuous reinforcement of MNLC through the recruitment of fighters from Kaga Bandoro and Ndélé. Despite its separation from Mahamat Al-Khatim's MPC, the MNLC continues to be provided with ammunition from and recruit fighters in MPC-controlled areas in Kaga Bandoro and Ndélé. With Bahar's allegedly willingness to change the demographic of the area and reinforce its positions, RJ leaders have become fearful that MNLC will take control over the Paoua sub-prefecture and of all revenues previously shared with them.⁵⁹

After the killings of cattle herders in November 2017, MNLC killed a RJ leader (Colonel Belanga) in reprisal at the end of the month. On 28 December 2017, RJ attacked MNLC's positions in several locations. RJ's unprecedented operational capacity displayed during the combats demonstrates that the group has received support both in men and weapons. The Panel has identified Bangui as the main origin of supply for RJ.

On 12 January 2018, in an effort to restore stability in the area, MINUSCA launched "Operation Mbaranga". The operation forced Bahar's group to leave Paoua's surroundings and relocate near the Chadian border.⁶⁰ RJ stopped its activities but has remained mobilized in the event that the end of the "Operation Mbaranga" enables the MNLC's return.⁶¹

Facing difficulties in the northwest and seeking to reposition himself in the political process, Ahmat Bahar recently joined FPRC and expressed support for its political strategy (see below).


⁵⁸ Meeting with community leaders and local officials, Paoua, 29 January-1 February 2018.

⁵⁹ Meeting with General Armel Sayo, RJ President, Bangui, 18 January 2018.


⁶⁰ Confidential report, 15 January 2018.

⁶¹ Meeting with Colonel Bessain Urbain, General Coordinnator of RJ, Paoua, 29 January 2018.

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 1 June 2018.



Annex 7.2: Bossangoa-Markounda-Nana Boguila triangle map and context.



As a side-effect of MINUSCA's "Operation Mbaranga" in Paoua, armed elements formerly belonging to MNLC have been raiding the area, attacking villages and stealing cattle that local people used for farming.⁶² The breach of the alliance between RJ and MPC led to clashes in Bodjomo on 29 December 2017 and Markounda on 2 January 2018.⁶³ After this split, between 29 December 2017 and 1 March 2018, 17 civilians were reportedly killed.⁶⁴ As consequence, the town of Markounda turned into an IDP camp hosting 8,381 people from the city and the surrounding areas,⁶⁵ where the delivery of humanitarian assistance was highly challenging.

On 24 March 2018, an ICRC convoy was hijacked on the road between Nana Boguila and Markounda, delaying the provision of aid to the displaced population.⁶⁶ After the signature of the local peace agreement on 3 May 2018, the security situation in Markounda has improved and people were slowly going back to their houses.

⁶² Meeting with IDP representative, Markounda, 25 March 2018.

⁶³ Meeting with sub-prefect, Markounda, 25 March 2018; Meetings with MPC Zone Commander in Kouki, RJ Zone Commander in Bodjomo and MPC Zone Commander in Markounda, 25 March 2018.

⁶⁴ Meeting with Catholic Priest, Markounda, 25 March 2018.

⁶⁵ Meeting with IDP representative, Markounda, 25 March 2018.

⁶⁶ Confidential report, 26 March 2018.

Annex 7.3: Cases of rape and sexual assault in the Bossangoa area.

Another consequence of the instability in the area is the increase in the number of rapes and cases of sexual assault.⁶⁷ In this regard, a mass rape was reported in the village of Kiriwiri (involving 86 inhabitants), on the road between Nana Bakassa and Bouaye (Ouham prefecture). On 3 March 2018, the MSF-supported hospital in Bossangoa treated 10 women who had reported having been assaulted on 17 February in the bush surrounding the village. Two women were pregnant at the time of the attack, one had fresh knife wounds, and many were in shock.⁶⁸ Eight new victims were found on the villages of Kiriwiri and Housseem the week after, as a result of sensitization sessions.⁶⁹

The Panel gathered evidence of at least three other cases of rape against groups of 3-4 women, who were assaulted in the same area and sometimes abducted for several hours.⁷⁰ Villagers were not able to specify on which dates these attacks occurred. They told the Panel that a group of heavily armed herders whose leader is known as Balewa had been coming to the area during the dry season for the past three years, threatening the population but never targeting local women on such a large scale.⁷¹

According to the Panel's findings, it is most likely that a significant number of women living in the Nana Bakassa-Bouaye area have been raped and sexually assaulted in small groups and on different occasions over the first months of 2018. Also, based on the testimonies of survivors and village residents, as well as contextual evidence, herders from Balewa's group are likely to be the main perpetrators.

⁶⁷ MSF reported 56 cases in Bossangoa from September 2017 to 4 March 2018, compared to the 13 treated from January to August 2017.

⁶⁸ See <http://www.msf.org/en/article/central-african-republic-survivors-describe-mass-rape-ordeal-outside-bossangoa>, accessed on 15 March 2018.

⁶⁹ Meeting with MSF representative, Bossangoa, 23 March 2018.

⁷⁰ Meeting with survivors, Kiriwiri and Housseem, 24 March 2018.

⁷¹ Meetings with a group of local chiefs, Housseem, 24 March 2018.

Annex 7.4: Attack against humanitarian actors in Defei (Ouham prefecture) on 25 March 2018.

On 25 February 2018, six local humanitarian workers⁷² were carjacked and brutally killed between Defei and Markounda. They were going to launch an emergency education programme for IDPs and were therefore carrying a large amount of money (around \$5,500).⁷³ During its investigations at the scene on 26 March 2018, the Panel found several documents and personal belongings of the humanitarians. This demonstrates that the vehicle was most likely halted and searched on the main road, and later moved a few hundred meters into the bush. Once there, the six civilians were shot in the head and the vehicle burned.

Even though there were no direct witnesses of this massacre, the Panel gathered testimonies pointing to six armed elements associated with the local MPC and reportedly under the direct command of Abdallah, an arms trader reportedly of Chadian origin.⁷⁴ According to IDP testimonies, these men were also responsible for a raid in the villages of Gbangoro and Defei held on 21-22 February 2018, along the same road.⁷⁵

The latter incident was discovered by a MINUSCA patrol on 26 February, but local authorities were not informed until the following day. The bodies of the victims were collected on 1 March only.⁷⁶

⁷² The team was composed of two members of the national NGO Bangui Sans Frontières, one UNICEF consultant, two civil servants from the Ministry of Education and one assistant.

⁷³ Meeting with BSF representative, Bangui, 29 March 2018.

⁷⁴ Meeting with confidential source, Markounda, 25 and 26 March 2018.

⁷⁵ Meeting with confidential source, Markounda, 26 March 2018.

⁷⁶ Meeting with sub-prefect, Markounda, 25 March 2018.

Annex 7.5: Use of anti-balaka fighters, ISF and FACA elements as security providers for economic operators.

To operate in the CAR, especially in the provinces, economic operators, including mining companies, need to take measures to ensure their security. Some mining companies or cooperatives employ private security companies. As mentioned in the 2017 Panel's final report (S/2017/1023, para. 235), one such private security company operating in Sosso-Nakombo was employing former anti-balaka soldiers.

Other mining companies reportedly directly recruit anti-balaka or former anti-balaka fighters. Anti-balaka leaders in Bouar and some local authorities told the Panel that the use of former anti-balaka combatants as security providers was common practice for mining companies operating in the Abba area.⁷⁷

Some companies rather secure the provisioning of National defence and security forces through agreements with the Ministries of Defence and/or Interior. Such practices enable the companies to ensure their security without resorting to protection by armed groups; at the same time, they create additional tasks for FACA and ISF whose human resources and capabilities are limited. In Bouar, for instance, the FACA Deputy Commander told the Panel that more than a third of FACA deployed in the area were involved in the protection of mining companies.⁷⁸

In south-western CAR, the freedom of movement of many individuals and economic operators remain constrained due to insecurity and criminality (S/2017/1023, paras. 227-228). The Panel notes that, in the area of Berbérati and Nola, national defence and security forces often take advantage of this situation by providing paid escorts to Muslims willing to move in the area, including diamond and gold collectors.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Meeting with anti-balaka leader Bello and Patrick, Bouar, 26 March 2018; Meeting with a gendarme officer, Abba, 27 March 2018.

⁷⁸ Meeting with FACA Deputy Commander, Bouar, 27 March 2018.

⁷⁹ Meeting with FACA Commander, Nola, 13 January 2018. Meetings with economic operators and collectors, Nola, 12-13 January 2018, and Berbérati, 15-16 January 2018.

Below the list of gendarme elements put at the disposal of mining companies and buying houses. Document obtained by the Panel from the Deputy Director General of the Gendarmerie on 18 June 2018.

RECAPITULATIF DES GENDARMES AFFECTES A LA DISPOSITION DES SOCIÉTÉS MINÉRIÈRES ET DES MAÎTRES D'ACHAT

LISTE DES GENDARMES AFFECTÉS A LA DISPOSITION DES SOCIÉTÉS MINÉRIÈRES

N°	NOM	GRADE	DATE D'AFFECTATION	DATE DE DÉPART
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LISTE DES GENDARMES AFFECTÉS A LA DISPOSITION DES MAÎTRES D'ACHAT

N°	NOM	GRADE	DATE D'AFFECTATION	DATE DE DÉPART
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RECAPITULATIF DES GENDARMES AFFECTES A LA DISPOSITION DES SOCIÉTÉS MINÉRIÈRES ET DES MAÎTRES D'ACHAT

LISTE DES GENDARMES AFFECTÉS A LA DISPOSITION DES SOCIÉTÉS MINÉRIÈRES

N°	NOM	GRADE	DATE D'AFFECTATION	DATE DE DÉPART
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LISTE DES GENDARMES AFFECTÉS A LA DISPOSITION DES MAÎTRES D'ACHAT

N°	NOM	GRADE	DATE D'AFFECTATION	DATE DE DÉPART
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RECAPITULATIF DES GENDARMES AFFECTES A LA DISPOSITION DES SOCIÉTÉS MINÉRIÈRES ET DES MAÎTRES D'ACHAT

LISTE DES GENDARMES AFFECTÉS A LA DISPOSITION DES SOCIÉTÉS MINÉRIÈRES

N°	NOM	GRADE	DATE D'AFFECTATION	DATE DE DÉPART
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LISTE DES GENDARMES AFFECTÉS A LA DISPOSITION DES MAÎTRES D'ACHAT

N°	NOM	GRADE	DATE D'AFFECTATION	DATE DE DÉPART
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Annex 7.6: Gold mining in the Bossangoa area: the arrival of mining companies in an anti-balaka stronghold.

1. Anti-balaka involvement in gold exploitation in the Ouham prefecture

As indicated in the Panel's previous reports (S/2017/639, paras. 95-98 and S/2017/1032, paras. 230-232), gold exploitation has boomed in the Ouham prefecture since mid-2016.

At the time of the Panel's visit to Bossangoa (23-25 March 2018), the presence of the State authorities remained limited on the "Wili" mining site, with only a few USAF elements ensuring that miners have paid their licenses. Armed elements under local anti-balaka leaders remained in control of the site and its access (see S/2017/639, paras. 95-98 and S/2017/1032, paras. 230-232).

A largely similar situation is now prevailing at "Bolakaba", a site located close to Ben Zembe, about 40 km northwest of Bossangoa. Security, access to the site and gold exploitation at "Bokalaba" are managed by local anti-balaka leaders (Ouham Zone Commander called "Romain"), former FACA elements (including Ghislain Danboy) and their associates (including Christian Ngana alias "Toko"), while representatives of local authorities recognize having very limited visibility on current activities.⁸⁰ Ben Zembe is the hometown of former President François Bozizé and anti-balaka combatants from the area are reportedly still connected to his family.⁸¹

Exploitation in Zere (25 km east of Bossangoa), the third main site previously identified in the Bossangoa area (S/2017/1032, paras. 233), has ceased since early 2018.⁸²

2. Mining companies' operations in the area

While exerting limited control over the area, the CAR Government has granted mining permits to two companies – i.e. Zighu mining and Tieng Pao – to operate on and around the "Wili" site. This decision has created discontent among the site managers, artisanal miners and anti-balaka elements who are anxious not to lose control over the area and their source of revenue;⁸³ it is therefore likely to generate tensions in the area.

On 22 May 2018, workers employed by Tieng Pao constructing a road to access the "Wili" mining site were harassed by locals.⁸⁴

Zighu Mining has decided to delay its activities in the area, considering operating in the area could put its staff at risk.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ Meetings with Ouham Prefect, gendarme officers, and confidential sources, Bossangoa, 24 March 2018.

⁸¹ Meeting with local authorities and confidential sources, Bossangoa, 23-24 March 2018.

⁸² Meeting with the Zere site chief, Bossangoa, 24 March 2018.

⁸³ Meeting with Member of Parliament from Bossangoa, Bangui, 6 June 2018.

⁸⁴ Confidential report, 22 May 2018. Meeting with Member of Parliament from Bossangoa, 6 June 2018.


⁸⁵ Phone conversation with Zighu mining manager, 25 June 2018.

Annex 7.7: Poaching and ivory trafficking in the Dzanga Sangha National reserve.

Poaching and wildlife trafficking around the Dzanga Sangha Special Reserve, as cited in previous Panel reports (S/2014/452, paras 74-76; S/2014/762, paras. 149-150), continues. Poachers do not belong to organized armed groups but are rather related to criminal networks. The ivory from the CAR is trafficked into the Republic of the Congo and, to a larger extent, to Cameroon.⁸⁶

As noted in previous reports (S/2014/762, para. 149), representatives of the CAR local authorities, and in particular internal security forces, are at times supporting, if not actively participating, in such activities. On 14 January 2018, the Panel interviewed three individuals imprisoned in Bayanga for poaching activities; they reported having acted on behalf of a retired police officer named "Anatole" who previously headed the Bayanga police station.

Map of the Dzanga-Sangha Reserve and the Dzanga National Park.
Available at <http://www.dzanga-sangha.org/content/maps>, accessed on 22 June 2018.



⁸⁶ Meeting with rangers and local authorities, Bayanga, 14 January 2018. Meeting with conservationists, Bangui, 16 January 2018.

Annex 8.1: Additional information on, and pictures of, arms trafficking organized by Bangui-based individuals on MINUSCA escorted vehicles.

On 29 January 2018, UPC members informed the Panel that they had stopped and searched vehicles escorted by MINUSCA in front of a MINUSCA camp in Ippy, in which they found hunting ammunition and other items.⁸⁷ When MINUSCA Force realized that the armed group was searching the vehicles, they pushed them away and secured all vehicles and items.⁸⁸ Upon further investigation by MINUSCA and national security forces coming from Bambari, it was established that 1,727 rounds of hunting ammunition from the Manufacture de cartouches congolaise (MACC),⁸⁹ 602 packages of tramadol and 1,5 kg of marijuana were in the vehicles and subsequently brought to Bambari on 1 February 2018.

Six persons were arrested. On 14 February, the Grand Court of Bambari sentenced two of the arrested for complicity to the illegal detention of hunting ammunition, psychotropic substances and narcotics; one of the arrested for the illegal detention of hunting ammunition; and Zala Didier for the illegal detention of hunting ammunition, psychotropic substances and narcotics.⁹⁰ ECOLOG was exonerated of any responsibility in the trafficking of prohibited items in its trucks.

According to witnesses, one of the convicted persons, Didier Zala, regularly used the trucks of ECOLOG, a MINUSCA contractor, to smuggle hunting ammunition, commonly used by both hunters and anti-balaka fighters, to the towns of Bria, Bambari and Ippy. Prohibited items were used to be hidden in the trucks' cab and under the trucks where a false wooden floor was installed (see picture below). One of the persons met by the Panel declared that on several occasions, he went to Lopola, the Republic of the Congo, with Didier Zala where he bought MACC hunting ammunition which was later put in his truck's cab and later joined the convoy to Bambari, Bria and Ippy. There, part of the ammunition and tramadol was sold to individual hunters while other boxes were provided to anti-balaka fighters.⁹¹ The Panel continues to investigate whether, and to what extent, vehicles escorted by MINUSCA are used by individuals to traffic weapons, ammunition and/or gold and diamonds which benefit armed groups.

⁸⁷ Phone communication with UPC members, 29 January 2018.

⁸⁸ Phone communication with confidential source, 7 February 2018.


⁸⁹ This type of ammunition was observed by the Panel on many occasions (see for instance, S/2017/1023, para. 107; S/2017/639, paras. 92 and 93 and annex 6.4).

⁹⁰ Confidential correspondence, 1 February 2018.

⁹¹ Meeting with five confidential sources, Bangui, 28 and 30 May, 4 and 18 June.


Rounds of MACC hunting ammunition, packages of tramadol, marijuana and vehicles seized in Ippy on 29 January 2017. Photographs obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 1 February 2017.






Annex 8.2: Trafficking and selling of hunting ammunition.

Photograph of boxes of MACC ammunition seized by customs in Port Beach in Bangui, taken by the Panel on 31 May 2018.



Photographs of MACC hunting ammunition being sold at local market in Kaga Bandoro on 2 June 2018. Photograph obtained by the Panel from confidential source on 3 June 2018.





The Panel witnessed the selling of MACC ammunition on local markets in Bria and Kaga-Bandoro.⁹²

⁹² Panel's mission to Bria, 8-11 June 2018. Panel's mission to Kaga Bandoro, 31 April-3 May.

Annex 8.3: Temporary measures taken by Congolese authorities to limit diversion of MACC ammunition.


On 17 April 2018, during the Panel's visit to the Republic of the Congo, the Congolese authorities realized that the national legislation governing the manufacture of ammunition was in many ways not compatible with the Kinshasa Convention. It namely does not require manufacturers to equip their goods with the necessary marking information that allows for an easy tracking of ammunition.

Pending legislative reform, the Congolese Government adopted a circular note sent to the Director-General of the MACC Manufacture in Pointe Noire and the Director-General of Grasset Sporafric (the only authorized distributor) in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire informing them about the following administrative measures:

- Holders of an authorization to open a hunting ammunition shop cannot anymore purchase ammunition directly from MACC, the only manufacturer of the hunting ammunition in the Republic of the Congo;
- Grasset Sporafric becomes the only supplier/distributor of hunting ammunition to the holders of an authorization to open a hunting ammunition shop;
- Holders of an authorization to open a hunting ammunition shop, when purchasing hunting ammunition from Grasset Sporafric, must provide required documents without which they are not allowed to purchase ammunition;
- Grasset Sporafric must, at regular intervals, provide all information on the sold MACC ammunition to the Directorate-General of the Ministry of Territorial Administration;
- The hunting ammunition must be transported according to existing regulations;
- Foreign merchants and companies willing to purchase MACC ammunition must abide by the existing regulatory framework.

The Congolese authorities also informed the Panel that the national legislation would be modified so as to take into account all obligations under the Kinshasa Convention.

Document obtained by the Panel from the Congolese authorities in Brazzaville on 19 April 2018.



Article 13 : « Le vente sur le territoire de la République de Congo des armes et munitions classées dans les autres catégories ne peut être effectuée que par l'intermédiaire :

- des importateurs agréés conformément aux dispositions de l'article 8 ;
- des commerçants ou sociétés de commerce préalablement autorisés par arrêté du ministre de l'Intérieur ».

Article 14 : « Le commerce des armes et munitions visé à l'article précédent est soumis à contrôle ».

A cet effet, pour renforcer les mesures de sécurisation relatives à l'activité de vente de munitions de chasse sur le territoire national, l'achat par vos clients, détenteurs de l'arrêté autorisant l'ouverture d'un dépôt de vente de munitions de chasse d'effecteurs d'armement de munitions suivants :

- 1- aucun détenteur de l'arrêté ne devra plus s'approvisionner directement à la Manufacture de Cartouches Congolaises (MACC) à Pointe-Noire qui reste le seul fabricant ;
- 2- Grosset Spécific Pointe-Noire et Brazzaville est le fournisseur auprès de qui, tous les détenteurs d'arrêté autorisant l'ouverture d'un dépôt de vente de munitions de chasse doivent s'approvisionner, selon les quantités clairement exprimées ;
- 3- aucun détenteur d'arrêté ne peut être servi s'il n'a en préalable, présenté à Grosset Spécific Pointe-Noire ou Brazzaville, les documents ci-après :
 - la pièce d'identité en cours de validité et deux (2) photocopies ;
 - le certificat de vie signé de sous-préfet, du maire de la commune sans arrondissement, de l'administrateur-maire de l'arrondissement ou de la communauté urbaine de lieu où le dépôt est effectivement ouvert ;
- 4- après livraison par Grosset Spécific Pointe-Noire ou Brazzaville, cette société a l'obligation de transmettre à la direction générale de l'administration de territoire, par courrier régulièrement adressé, copies des documents des livraisons effectives avec précision du jour, du mois, de la date, de l'année et de l'heure de livraison ;
- 5- le transport devra être assuré conformément à la réglementation en vigueur ;

En outre, les intervenants dont pourraient être demandeurs les commerçants et sociétés commerciales des pays limitrophes doivent obéir à la réglementation en vigueur en République du Congo.

Ces mesures doivent être largement vulgarisées auprès de vos clients ainsi qu'auprès des cadres et agents relevant respectivement de vos administrations.

Une non-observation pourrait mobiliser à me retourner sévèrement contre la société défailante.

Brazzaville, le 27 MAR 2018

Raymond Zéphirin ABOULOU

Copies :

- préfet directeur général de l'administration du territoire ;
- préfets de département ;
- maires de commune ;
- sous-préfets ;
- administrateurs-maires d'arrondissement et de communauté urbaine

Annex 8.4: Audit and export of the diamond stockpiles.

Pursuant to the Operational Framework of June 2015,⁹³ the KP Monitoring team contracted a company to conduct an audit of the diamonds stockpiled by buying houses during the period when exports of CAR diamonds were suspended.

The company audited the stocks of two buying houses, Sodiam and Sud Azur, while the third buying house owning stocks – i.e. listed entity BADICA – did not participate in the exercise. BADICA's managing director, Abdoukarim Abbas, told the Panel that he had not been properly informed by the CAR national authorities of the auditors' arrival and that, in his absence from Bangui, no one had the authority to grant the auditors' access to the company's stocks.⁹⁴ He told the Panel that the stocks remained available for audit.

During the KP Plenary meeting held on 10-14 December 2017 in Brisbane, Australia, it was decided that only diamonds from the western CAR, with a paper trail confirming that their mining and purchase did not benefit armed groups, would be cleared for export. As a result, 66,737 carats were exported in early 2018.

In the Panel's view, this decision is in conformity with the provisions of the Security Council resolutions which state that providing support for armed groups through the illicit exploitation of natural resources is a sanctionable act.

⁹³ Available from <https://kimberleyprocess.com/en/2015-administrative-decision-car>.

⁹⁴ Meeting with BADICA manager, Bangui, January 2018.